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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON CROSS-BORDER B2B TRUST AND
COMMITMENT
BY
YEN-HUNG STEVEN LIU
APRIL 15th, 2018
Committee Chair:

Dr. Salih Tamer Cavusgil & Dr. Leigh Anne Liu

Major Academic Unit:

Marketing and International Business

The relationship marketing literature suggests trust and commitment are two central facets in
business-to-business (B2B) relationships. However, extant studies criticize how relationship
marketing literature theorizes B2B trust and commitment. This dissertation aims to draw various
perspectives from disciplines of Sociology, Psychology, and Management Sciences to examine
the cultivation of B2B trust and commitment to shed lights on the literature.
In Essay 1, I reported empirical findings on 202 international buyer-seller relationships. Essay 1
reveals that, within bilateral asset specificity, (1) achieving goodwill reciprocity always enhances
trust, regardless of the duration contingency; (2) violating equivalence reciprocity impairs trust
over the duration. Essay 1 resolves inconsistent findings of how relationship duration influence
on B2B trust in the relationship marketing literature. Indeed, another contribution of Essay 1 is to
extend the field’s understandings on bilateral asset specificity by proposing the underlying
reciprocity in addition to economic-based explanation.
In Essay 2, I argued that, in the triadic business relationship among exporter, importer, and host
market buyers, importers are threatened by the risk of disintermediation and face the conundrum
between to support and to against the supplier’s global marketing in the host market. I reported
findings from 164 triadic business. Essay 2 empirically identifies that, from the importer’s view,
the three focal dyadic business relationships (i.e. exporter-importer, importer-buyer, and
exporter-buyer) are interconnected with each other. Importers employ the reference point
approach to manage the multi-dyadic business relationships. The results reveal that, importers
holistically evaluate the buyer’s relative commitment to the importer themselves than to the
upstream exporter to form their host market strategies.
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INTRODUCTION TO ESSAYS
Motivation of the Study
Business-to-Business (B2B) relationship is important in improving relational task
performances and values (Jap and Ganesan 2000; Palmatier 2008; Zhang et al. 2016). Extant
studies suggest trust and commitment are the two focal factors in B2B relationships (Heide 1994;
Doney and Cannon 1997; Dyer and Chu 2000; Heide and Wathne 2006). Morgan and Hunt
(1994) suggested that B2B trust and commitment are the dual relationship factors in facilitating
information sharing, reconciling conflicts, and enhancing efficient cooperation. A meta-analysis
on interorganizational relationship management literature in 1987–2004 also reveals that trust
and commitment are the two critical variables across most published works (Palmatier et al.
2006).
Given the widely-acknowledged importance of B2B trust and commitment, however, extant
studies criticize on how literature theorize B2B trust and commitment. One of the most prevalent
critiques is that B2B relationship management literature adopts the view that neglects the
dynamics of social exchanges, changing interorganizational climate, and relationship stages
(Chiles and McMackin 1996; McEvily et al. 2003; McEvily and Zaheer 2006). This paper
accordingly intends to draw various bodies of literature from Sociology, Psychology, and
Management Sciences to examine the formation of B2B trust and commitment to shed lights on
international B2B relationship literature.
Responding to the “under-socialized” critics (Granovetter 1985; McEvily et al. 2003), this
paper plans to offer examinations on two levels of cross-border B2B relationships. The first
essay will examine on trust-building between international buyers and sellers at the one-to-one
1

relationship level. Based on an examination on dyadic B2B relationships, the first essay
identifies the underlying social exchanges within bilateral asset specificity to extend the
conventional Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) perspective, which is one of the mostly used
theoretical lens in exporter-importer relationships (Leonidou et al. 2014). The second essay
expands to the triadic business relationships among home market exporters, the intermediate
importers bridging between home and host markets, and host market industrial buyers. The
second essay offers investigation beyond the one-to-one dyad to address the importer’s
exhaustive configurations in developing relationship marketing strategies in the host market.
Significance of Essay 1
Grounded in Social Exchange Theory (SET), the first essay is motivated by two unresolved
issues. First, scholars find mixed results on how relationship duration facilitates B2B trust (e.g.
Vanneste et al. (2014)). Building on the Dwyer et al. (1987) conceptual framework, empirical
studies follow the assumption that relationship duration is a proxy measure of prior trust-building
efforts. In the view of SET, this assumption overlooks that trust-building lies in the exchange
process between B2B parties during relationship. The first essay offers clarifications that, trustbuilding lies in bilateral exchange efforts, and relationship duration is rather a contingency factor
that moderates the effects of reciprocal exchanges. Second, although Transaction Cost Analysis
(TCA) is one of the most used theoretical lens in B2B trust, TCA is often criticized for
neglecting the exchange process in B2B trust-building. To provide clarity to these issues, the first
essay empirically validates that bilateral asset specificity constitutes social exchange processes,
which communicate goodwill reciprocity and equivalence reciprocity.
In essay 1, empirical findings on 202 international buyer-seller relationships report that,
within bilateral asset specificity, (1) achieving goodwill reciprocity always enhances trust,
regardless of the duration contingency; (2) violating equivalence reciprocity impairs trust over
2

the duration. A major contribution of this essay is to extend the field’s understandings on
bilateral asset specificity by proposing the sociological meanings in addition to solely economicbased explanation.
Significance of Essay 2
The second essay will examine B2B commitment at the triadic business structure level.
Specifically, we examine the multi-dyads in a global channel, including three parties of exporting
suppliers, importing agents, and host market industrial buyers. Aiming at an extension from the
current exporter-importer relationship literature, this essay focuses on the importer’s perspective
to address the mutual-contingencies between following two dyadic business relationships:
exporter-importer and the importer-buyer business links.
Our in-depth interviews reveal a conundrum for importers between to support or to against
the supplier’s global marketing. On the one hand, importers are motivated to leverage and
promote their upstream supplier’s industrial brand to achieve better performances in the host
market. That is, the exporting supplier’s global marketing is a remarkable privilege for importers
to take advantage of. On the other hand, importers fear of the threats of disintermediation. For
the importers, promoting the exporting supplier’s brand in the host market might create the host
market buyer’s excessively commitment to the supplier, without likewise level of commitment to
the importer themselves. To secure their intermediate position in the global value chain,
importers might adopt non-cooperation strategy in the host market to attenuate the influences of
supplier’s global marketing on host market buyers.
Although the conundrum for importers is a critical issue in practice, academic discussions
are limited in literature. Based on Organizational Reference Point and Aspiration Theory
(Fiegenbaum et al. 1996; Hsieh et al. 2015), we propose that, importers would regard the link
between their upstream supplier and downstream buyer as the reference point. This essay
3

identifies that importers would regard buyer’s relative commitment to the importer than to the
exporting supplier as a central determinant in deciding the importer’s host market strategy. Essay
2 suggests that, as the frontier bridging between the home market and the host market, importers
take advantage of their boundary-spanning position to access comprehensive information in the
global value chain. The findings confirm that, to decide the strategy between to support and to
against to the supplier’s global marketing in the host market, importers rely on their
advantageous information access to draw exhaustive observations to evaluate the triadic
relationships.
In essay 2, based on findings from 164 triadic business relationships among home market
exporter, importer, and host market buyer, we empirically identify that (1) from importer’s view,
the three focal dyadic business relationships (i.e. exporter-importer, importer-buyer, and
exporter-buyer) are interconnected with each other, and importers employ the reference point
approach to manage the multi-dyadic business relationships; (2) faced with the conundrum
between to support and to against the supplier’s global marketing in the host market, importers
evaluate the buyer’s relative commitment to the importer than to the supplier to form their host
market strategies.

4

Essay1: Always Trust in Old Friends? Effects of Reciprocity within Bilateral Asset
Specificity on Trust in International B2B Partnerships

1. Introduction
Grounded in Social Exchange Theory (SET), this research addresses two unresolved
theoretical issues in interorganizational trust literature. The first observation is that empirical
works report inconsistent findings regarding how relationship duration facilitates business-tobusiness (B2B) trust. We thus aim to offer a clarification on the role of relationship duration in
B2B trust-building process. The other theoretical puzzle is from the Transaction Cost Analysis
(TCA). The article seeks to fill a gap in theory regarding social aspects of exchange and its
development process, specifically related to asset specificity in the context of B2B trust. Our
effort is directed to a widely lamented issue (Granovetter 1985; McEvily et al. 2003; McEvily
and Zaheer 2006) that TCA downplays social foundations of transactions (e.g., meta-analysis
evidence from Palmatier et al. (2006); Leonidou et al. (2014); Zhong et al. (2017)). Heeding the
warnings in the literature, we empirically focus on bilateral asset specificity and its role in
underlying social exchange process that triggers goodwill reciprocity and equivalence
reciprocity.
The conventional view asserts that adequate relationship duration strengthens
interorganizational trust through connecting two parties beyond the discrete transaction,
enhancing mutual understanding, and aligning them to pursue common goals (Dwyer et al. 1987;
Morgan and Hunt 1994). For example, Ganesan (1994) states “…such periods provide both
parties with a greater understanding of each other and their idiosyncrasies. Thus, experience with
the vendor is likely to increase a retailer's trust in the vendor's credibility and benevolence (p.5).”
This theme repeats itself in relationship marketing studies as they underline with the same tone
that relationship duration accrues interorganizational trust (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Doney and
5

Cannon 1997; Zhang et al. 2016). However, empirical findings are mixed. Scholars find that the
connection between relationship duration and interorganizational trust varies from positive
effects (Brashear et al. 2003; Zhang et al. 2016; Dong et al. 2017), to insignificant effects (Heide
1994; Palmatier et al. 2006; Ekici 2013; Vanneste et al. 2014), to negative effects (Gulati and
Nickerson 2008). Therefore, the role of relationship duration on interorganizational trustbuilding remains unclear.
Building on the Dwyer et al. (1987) conceptual framework, empirical studies attribute a
constructive role in developing a mutual understanding and maturity of relationship (Anderson
and Weitz 1989; Gulati 1995; Bejou et al. 1996; Sa Vinhas and Heide 2014). Despite such
optimism, the length of relationship does not guarantee mutual reliance and relationship bonding
(Fichman and Levinthal 1991). Instead, relationships mature during the social exchange process
along with the complex experience of shared ideas, and form a mutual identity over bonding
between two parties. (Blau 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Cook et al. 2013). In other
words, what matters is not how long the relationship lasts, but what has been done in the
exchange dynamics within the course of the relationship. Responding to inconsistent empirical
findings, scholars call for process-based perspectives on interorganizational trust rather than
directly viewing relationship age as a proxy for accumulated trust-building efforts (Heide and
Wathne 2006; Möllering 2006; Akrout and Diallo 2017; Zhong et al. 2017). Thus, our first
research question is: How does relationship duration affect the trust-building process in
international B2B partnerships?
Based on SET, this article posits the contingency role of relationship duration in
interorganizational trust-building. The process lies in the relationship dynamics between two
parties – how they communicate certain social norms, and comply with them. By complying,
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they ensure both predictability and stability to facilitate trust (Blau 1964; Cropanzano and
Mitchell 2005; Cropanzano et al. 2016). As such, repeated mutual understandings and
expectations on certain norms are incrementally communicated, learned, and internalized
through continuing interactions (Cook et al. 2013). Over time, the fog gradually clears in
partners’ behavior, norms get established, compliance leaves a track record. Alongside with
growing compliance, predispositions also multiply, the partners’ expectations turn sharper and
stricter to ensure sustainable exchange and reduced relational risk. (Blau 1964; Cook et al. 2013).
Hence, the importance of norm-complying exchanges on trust increases over time. With this
view, one notable contribution of the current study is to identify relationship duration as a
contingent moderator between norm-complying exchanges and trust.
Second, another issue within interorganizational trust-building studies is a void left by the
Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA). Although the most widely used theoretical lens (i.e.,
Leonidou et al. (2014) meta-analysis), TCA often receives critical scrutiny in the examination of
interorganizational trust. The reasons include neglect of social context, path dependencies, and
the interactive process in relationship bonding (Granovetter 1985; McEvily et al. 2003). McEvily
et al. (2003) state “the Williamsonian view reflects an under-socialized view of the organization
and coordination of economic activity and the relationship between economic actors, based on a
limited understanding of how trust really works (p.99).” Responding to the critiques on applying
TCA to interorganizational trust-building, we address the underlying reciprocity within bilateral
asset specificity.
The present study draws from the Social Exchange Theory to propose a more socialized,
context-oriented, and path-dependent investigation on the usage of TCA framework in
interorganizational trust. Our approach has merits. For instance, Zhong et al. (2017) after a meta-
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analysis suggest that TCA and SET could be complementary perspectives in understanding trust
across organizational boundaries. Each party interprets the opponent’s move depending on
whether or not the move complies with the reciprocity norm (Blau 1964; Emerson 1976;
Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005; Cook et al. 2013). Given that TCA-based studies claim asset
specificity to be one of the most influential factors in interorganizational relationships (Geyskens
et al. 2006; Palmatier et al. 2006), we investigate how reciprocity within bilateral asset
specificity would influence interorganizational trust. Accordingly, our second research question
is: Does reciprocity within bilateral asset specificities play a role in the trust-building process in
international B2B partnerships?
Building on SET insights, any form of ‘give-and-take’ interaction constitutes a social
exchange process. Accordingly, we contend that bilateral asset specificity consists of an
underlying social exchange process between the parties, a process that affirms the opponent’s
goodwill, strengthens the reciprocity beliefs, and indeed elevates trust. The reciprocity is also
constitutive. It facilitates an expectation that a good-deed engenders the return of the good-deed
(Blau 1964; Molm et al. 2007). In the mutual exchange of positive behavior, reciprocity emerges
in two components (Gouldner 1960; Hoppner and Griffith 2011; Hoppner et al. 2015; Swärd
2016). In the one, the concept of reciprocity is construed on exchanges of latent goodwill
intentions (partner’s actions in the dyad are more mutual-interest driven than self-interest
driven). In the other, reciprocity is built on the equivalence of contributions (the level of
investment in comparison to that of the partner). The present investigation contributes to the
literature by identifying goodwill reciprocity and equivalence reciprocity within bilateral asset
specificity to extend the field’s understandings.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce the relevant
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literature on relationship marketing and describe how applying the SET extends our knowledge.
Next, we illustrate our conceptual framework and hypotheses. We then report an empirical study
of 202 international buyer-seller relationships. Methodology and empirical results are also
presented. Finally, we conclude with theoretical extensions and managerial implications.
2. Theoretical Background
2.1 Interorganizational Trust
Trust is a focal factor in interorganizational relationship studies (Ganesan, 1994; Morgan &
Hunt, 1994). For example, Heide (1994) delineates trust as an inter-organization governance
mechanism that improves cooperation and reduces opportunism in interorganizational exchange.
Doney, Cannon and Mullen (1998) define interorganizational trust as "… as a willingness to rely
on another party and to take action in circumstances where such action makes one vulnerable to
the other party” (page 4). McEvily et al. (2003) state that mutual trust creates favorable
conditions for partners to cooperate and generate improved performance. Extant studies
empirically verify that trust-based international B2B relationships enjoy superior relationship
performance (Zhang et al. 2003; Cavusgil et al. 2004; Katsikeas et al. 2009).
Although the importance of interorganizational trust is widely acknowledged, two questions
remain unanswered. First, the role of the relationship duration is unclear. Conceptual works
explore the role of relationship duration in trust but differ on the question of why and how. For
example, Dwyer et al. (1987) propose a conceptual model to differentiate between discrete
transactions and relational exchanges, suggesting that relationship duration transforms economic
transactions into social exchanges. Anderson and Weitz (1989) posit that the age of the
relationship represents the level of bilateral relationship inertia in repeated interactions that
signify established communications and reliable routines. Similarly, empirical findings are
significantly mixed, even among meta-analysis studies. One meta-analytical study corroborates
9

that relationship duration fails to influence interorganizational trust (Palmatier et al. 2006), but
another meta-analysis suggests the relationship duration augments interorganizational trust
(Zhong et al. 2017).

2.2 Asset Specificity
Asset specificity is a central piece in TCA. In particular, the TCA posits a strong and purely
calculative view of the concept. Put simply, TCA considers the difficulty of redeployment of
assets outside the relationship due to specificity. The resulting lock-in condition requires the
safeguarding control and places the investing party in an unfavorable position (Williamson 1985;
1991). Bilateral asset specificity lock-in both the parties in the relationship and reduce the
concern on opportunism (e.g. Ganesan (1994); Poppo et al. (2015)). TCA-based studies in
interorganizational relationship employ the calculative view that bilateral asset specificity
stabilizes relationship by creating a “mutual hostage” condition (Heide 1994; Sa Vinhas and
Heide 2014).
This above view of asset specificity draws criticism as an under-socialized explanation. The
void in the explanation, the scholars argue, emerges from a static framework neglecting attitude
changes (Chiles and McMackin 1996); assumption of calculative bounded rationality regardless
of the relationship context (Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Bachmann and Zaheer 2008); and a strong
assumption of behavioral opportunism across early and mature relationships (Rindfleisch and
Heide 1997). Moreover, relationship stage and contingencies of past exchanges alter the social
meanings to the relationship-specific investments perceived by each party (Cropanzano and
Mitchell 2005; Cook et al. 2013; Cropanzano et al. 2016).
Recognizing the warnings from extant research, we deploy a more socialized angle to
examine the TCA framework in interorganizational trust-building (Wathne and Heide 2000;
10

McEvily et al. 2017). In our view, the SET is a useful companion to serve in augmenting the
theoretical arguments of TCA. SET studies suggest that any form of bilateral interaction in the
ongoing ‘give-and-take process’ constitutes a social exchange process (Blau 1964; Cropanzano
and Mitchell 2005; Cook et al. 2013). Accordingly, we investigate the underlying social
exchange process within bilateral asset specificity.

2.3 Social Exchange Theory
Social Exchange Theory (SET) explores social interaction within the exchange process
(Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976). As one of the prominent views in interorganizational relationships
(Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), SET regards trust as the crucial factor that stabilizes a
relationship because trust induces partners to be less calculating and more collaborative to
achieve mutual goals (Blau, 1964, Emerson, 1976). In agreement with Zhong et al. (2017) that
TCA and SET could be complementary perspectives in understanding interorganizational trust,
this research provides a fresh perspective by integrating related research streams.
We borrow from the SET to shed light on multiple theoretical puzzles. First, we propose a
model which employs the contingency approach to examine interorganizational trust-building.
According to SET, trust cultivation lies in an exchange process where both partners fulfill their
mutual expectations on focal norms such as reciprocity. Affirming experiences, in turn, foster
stronger reciprocity expectations and future reciprocating behaviors (Cook et al., 2013). We aim
to understand how the links between reciprocating activities and trust are dependent on the
relationship duration, as the shared beliefs of reciprocity norms evolve through the history of
interactions. SET asserts that norms in a continued social exchange root deeper and get
sanctioned over time (Blau, 1964; Cook et al., 2013). This learning process gradually reinforces
the exchange behavior and a stronger reciprocating stance. Therefore, the SET offers a sound
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basis for theorizing duration as a contingency in interorganizational trust-building.
Second, the SET extends our knowledge by identifying reciprocity within bilateral asset
specificity. The TCA explanations of asset specificity are purely calculative and forward-looking.
Based on SET, the TCA rationale overlooks the exchange process in the dynamics of
relationship-specific inputs between parties. For example, Blau (1964) states: “individuals and
groups are interested in, at least, maintaining a balance between inputs and outputs and staying
out of debts in their social interactions; hence the strain toward reciprocity.” Because reciprocity
is bilateral, SET asserts that the level of complying with reciprocity to one party’s relational
inputs would depend on the other’s level of relational inputs (Cook et al. 2013). Therefore, we
integrate TCA and SET perspectives, offering a discussion of inherent social meanings across
different scenarios within bilateral asset specificity to address the neglected social
contextualization in TCA.
Extant studies from other disciplines support the idea of underlying reciprocity within
bilateral asset specificity. For example, behavioral economists suggest that game players’
reciprocity expectations deepen along accumulated practice of bilateral behavior in repeated
games (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher 2006). Evidence from
behavioral economists suggests that reciprocities can be operated through certain strategic
interactions between two economic sectors. The idea that reciprocity would be signified,
operated, and performed within bilateral asset specificity is also mentioned in a meta-analytical
review of relationship marketing studies (Palmatier et al. 2006). After an examination in the
interorganizational relationship management literature, Palmatier et al. (2006) suggest:
“integrating reciprocity into the relational-mediating framework may also explain the large,
direct effect of relationship investment on performance, such that people’s inherent desire to
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repay ‘debts’ generated by sellers’ investments may lead to performance-enhancing behaviors
(p.152).” We follow this suggestion and empirically examine how reciprocity can be signified,
operated, and performed within idiosyncratic bilateral asset specificity.
Finally, extending the SET literature, we identify certain interorganizational activities within
the bilateral asset specificity that fulfill reciprocities. Cropanzano et al. (2016) review the SET
theoretic remedies in business research and indicate that SET scholars emphasize hedonic value
but overlook the exhibited activities. Cropanzano et al. (2016) suggest future SET studies should
further examine how the initiating and responding activities in a relationship shape the
participants’ attitude and future behaviors (page 46). In response, the present investigation
identifies how social norms evolve through exhibited activities (the bilateral asset specificity in
our research context) at the interorganizational level.

2.4 Reciprocity: The Focal Norm in Trust-Building
Reciprocity is a critical element in interorganizational exchanges (Dwyer et al. 1987;
Rokkan et al. 2003; Zhang et al. 2016). Bagozzi (1995) identifies reciprocity as “the core of
marketing relationships (p. 275).” Palmatier et al. (2006) suggest “The classic mediating model
of relationship marketing should be adapted to include alternative mediated pathways (e.g.,
reciprocity) (p.150 in Table 6).” Empirical studies also examine the virtue of reciprocity in
relationship marketing (Dwyer et al. 1987; Heide and John 1992; Bello et al. 2003; Hoppner et
al. 2015). Palmatier et al. (2009) address the role of customer gratitude in relationship marketing
based on the rationale of reciprocity. Overall, the importance of reciprocity in interorganizational
relationship management has been widely acknowledged.
In the interorganizational relationship management area, reciprocity is generally defined as
a unidimensional concept (Heide and John 1992; Aulakh et al. 1996; Gençtürk and Aulakh 2007;
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Paswan et al. 2017). Conceptualization of unidimensional reciprocity in interorganizational
studies ranges from increasing interdependences in collaboration (Dwyer et al. 1987), exchange
of favors in the mutual give-and-take process (Serva et al. 2005), to reciprocation of relational
benefits (Lioukas and Reuer 2015).
To resolve inconsistencies in conceptualizing reciprocity in the literature, recent research
regards reciprocity to be a multi-faceted concept in interorganizational partnerships. Pervan et al.
(2009) investigate sales relationships in industrial marketing and find that reciprocity evolves
with both partner’s communication affirming goodwill and equity/balance of the relationship.
Hoppner and Griffith (2011) empirically verify two sub-facets of reciprocity in the context of
international B2B relationships: immediate exchange of goodwill and return of favors in
equivalence. Swärd (2016) conducts in-depth interviews and finds that interorganizational trust
lies in both small actions that incrementally contribute to the expression of goodwill and large
actions that strongly signify and invoke reciprocal reactions for equivalence.
Accordingly, we follow Gouldner (1960), Hoppner and Griffith (2011), and Swärd (2016),
examining two facets of reciprocity in bilateral asset specificity: goodwill and equivalence.
Goodwill reciprocity refers to the exchange and affirmation of each other’s good-deed toward
mutual-interest motivations, which is evaluated through the mutually contingent exchange of
gratifications. Equivalence reciprocity is fulfilled when the level of effort or return is equivalent
to that of the partner (Gouldner 1960; Hoppner and Griffith 2011; Hoppner et al. 2015).
3. Research Framework & Hypotheses
Our conceptual framework is depicted in Figure 1. Achieving goodwill reciprocity lies in
the interdependent exchange process: one party’s reciprocating action would align with the
other’s past action. Continuing dyadic exchange is interdependent and contingent on the
partner’s goodwill. When perceiving goodwill from the partner’s reciprocating actions, an
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exchange party is more likely to have the higher level of trust in the relationship(Blau 1964;
Cook et al. 2013). Homans (1958) suggests that the opponent’s responding actions with
reciprocating gratitude could be viewed as a social reward that brings the sense of satisfaction
and reliability to the relationship. Blau (1964) specifies that such exchanges secure the
relationship with more predictability toward the future, and relational factors related to long-term
oriented attitudes such as trust, commitment, and loyalty would evolve through the social
rewarding process. More recent SET studies verify that the interactive process of exchanging
goodwill is the micro-foundation of forming social exchanges (Rao et al. 2005; Molm et al.
2007). The goodwill exchanges provide the lasting momentum in building trust in ongoing
relationships. Therefore, we propose:
Hypothesis 1: Achieving goodwill reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity enhances
trust in international B2B partnerships.
In SET, the concept of equivalence suggests that the distribution of effort is approximately
equivalent across the participants (Cook et al. 2013). Following SET, we suggest that breaching
equivalence reciprocity harms the participant’s trust since equivalence reciprocity implies
reliability and stability of the exchange (Gouldner 1960; Hoppner et al. 2015; Swärd 2016).
Based on SET, equivalence is crucial in sustaining long-term relationships as it signifies a
balanced structure between participants that neither participant perceives being unfairly exploited
(Emerson, 1976). Violating equivalence reciprocity sends out negative signals. An imbalanced
structure creates uncertainty about long-term sustainability. The partner being exploited may
seek out alternative relationships if available (Blau 1964). Not adhering to equivalence
reciprocity reflects instability, lack of predictability, and creates greater vulnerability for each
participant (Hoppner and Griffith 2011; Hoppner et al. 2015). This signals unpredictability on a
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partner firm’s future strategies and thus undermines trust (Cook et al., 2013). Therefore, we
propose:
Hypothesis 2: Violating equivalence reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity harms trust
in international B2B partnerships.
We assert that the importance of reciprocity on trust becomes more prominent over the
relationship duration. SET suggests that reciprocity norms can be more understood, internalized,
and emphasized in longer relationships, amplifying the impact of reciprocity on trust. In
accordance with Homans (1958), reciprocity requires a generalized exchange where equivalent
returns are not necessarily immediate but, over time, a balance of exchange must be achieved.
Accordingly, trust accrues as the relationship evolves. The reciprocating process can create a
self-reinforcing cycle, as the norm of reciprocity becomes more accepted, established, and
internalized. As such, each partner demands more reciprocated efforts in the relationship. That is,
higher expectations evolve after both parties have cooperated and attained mutual reliance.
Hence, we contend that both goodwill and equivalence reciprocity within bilateral asset
specificity become more salient in mature interorganizational relationships. Because relationship
duration implies higher mutual expectations on reciprocity, reciprocity within bilateral asset
specificity that achieve or violate the norm would become more impactful on trust over the
relationship duration. Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 3a: Achieving goodwill reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity more
strongly enhances trust over the duration of international B2B partnerships.

Hypothesis 3b: Violating equivalence reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity more
severely harms trust over the duration of international B2B partnerships.
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In harmony with the extant literature, we contend that interorganizational trust enhances
relationship performance in international partnerships (Delbufalo 2012; Zhong et al. 2017).
Relationship performance refers to the effectiveness and efficacy of the collaborative relationship
(Selnes and Sallis 2003; Katsikeas et al. 2009; Katsikeas et al. 2016). Trust enables smooth
bilateral communication and coordination that maximize the relationship’s potential. Empirical
studies have demonstrated that international trust-based B2B relationships lead to better
relational performance through forming and reshaping long-term oriented behaviors and attitudes
(Chiou and Droge 2006; Zaheer and Zaheer 2006; Katsikeas et al. 2009). Trust brings beneficial
effects in interorganizational collaboration such as information sharing (Bachmann and Zaheer
2008) and fewer concerns for opportunism (Dyer 2002). Based on these arguments, we propose:
Hypothesis 4: Trust in international B2B partnerships enhances relationship performance.
------ Insert Figure 1 About Here ----4. Method
4.1 Measuring Goodwill and Equivalence Reciprocity within Bilateral Asset Specificity
Three theoretical and technical reasons support our decision to measure reciprocity in
bilateral asset specificity. First, responding to critiques of TCA (Granovetter 1985; Ghoshal and
Moran 1996; Zhong et al. 2017), this study directly examines reciprocity within bilateral asset
specificity. Second, studies in interorganizational relationship management share the convention
of using bilateral asset specificity to measure a variety of focal constructs in SET, such as
accumulated invested costs in a relationship (Gulati and Nickerson 2008), level of embeddedness
(Gulati and Sytch 2007), and power structure (McEvily et al. 2017). Our analysis aligns with
previous SET studies and proposes the meaning of reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity.
Finally, our measurement design is widely used and verified in other well-established studies
(see He and Wong (2004), O’Reilly and Tushman (2008), and Li and Huang (2012)), indicating
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the methodological robustness of our construct operationalization. As such, we investigate how
bilateral asset specificity communicate goodwill reciprocity and equivalence reciprocity. An
overview of reciprocity elements is presented in Table 1.
------ Insert Table 1 about here ----In our model, we employ the interaction-term between buyer and seller’s asset specificity to
measure goodwill reciprocity. Interaction-term measures how the impact of one independent
variable on the dependent variable is contingent on the moderator (Hair et al. 2009). As
discussed, goodwill reciprocity is bilateral. It refers to the exchange and affirmation of each
other’s good-deed through the mutually contingent interaction of gratifications. When the buyer
has invested asset specificity and the seller reciprocates with corresponding asset specificity
commitments, the buyer would perceive goodwill in seller’s compliance with reciprocity to
reinforce trust. Therefore, for the buyer, the level of the perceived goodwill to the seller’s asset
specificity is associated with the buyer’s own invested level of asset specificity. Accordingly, we
measure the interaction terms between the buyer and seller’s asset specificity to evaluate
goodwill reciprocity. Empirical studies offer reasonable support for the operationalization. Jap
and Ganesan (2000) conceptualize the interaction between bilateral asset specificity as reciprocal
actions that facilitate commitment in a B2B relationship. De Vita et al. (2010) mention that
bilateral investments (interaction-term) can be regarded as a credible signal of self-enforcing
commitment in an exchange relationship.
TCE-based relationship marketing studies employ the interaction-term between buyer and
seller’s asset specificity to measure the relationship stability created by “mutual hostage”
condition (Artz 1999; Joshi and Stump 1999). Williamson (1985) suggests mutual investments of
bilateral asset specificity as an alternative safeguarding mechanism to hierarchy control.
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However, follow-up empirical studies employ the interaction-term between buyer and seller’s
asset specificity to measure “mutual hostage” condition do not find consistent empirical support.
Artz (1999) finds that the interaction-term of bilateral asset specificity does not significantly
increase relationship performance. Joshi and Stump (1999) report interaction-term of bilateral
asset specificity even undermines joint actions.
Commenting on the insignificance of proposed reciprocal asset specificity on performance,
Artz (1999) comments “ … it may be that certain governance mechanisms, e.g., relational norms,
can effectively moderate the impact of these factors thereby allowing interfirm exchanges to
continue (page 11).” Responding to the call, we testify the underlying social exchanges within
bilateral asset specificity that performs reciprocity. Regarding the interaction-term between
bilateral asset specificity, our framework suggests that SET-based explanation of reciprocity is a
more robust conceptualization than the TCA-based logic of mutual hostage. The reason is that
we identify trust as the focal mediator that connects the interaction-term of bilateral asset
specificity with relationship performance. As Blau (1964) states ”only social exchange tends to
engender feelings of personal obligations, gratitude, and trust; purely economic exchange as such
does not.” Our identification of the trust mediator supports the underlying social exchanges and
explains the unsupported hypotheses presented by TCA-based investigations (Artz 1999; Joshi
and Stump 1999).
The proposed model also considers the effect of equivalence reciprocity through observing
the inequality between the buyer and seller’s asset specificity. To measure inequality, we adopt
absolute difference, which is an adequate measure to capture the level of inequality between two
variables (He and Wong, 2004). SET has two explanations regarding inequality in bilateral
relationship contributions. One is that the more dominant partner uses its power advantage to
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demand the opponent sacrifice unilateral contributions and take advantage of the opponent’s
excessive efforts (Emerson 1962; Ebers and Semrau 2015). Because power structure is controlled
in our model, we believe inequality within bilateral asset specificity reflects the other SET
explanation that participants fail to fulfill the norm of equivalence (Cropanzano & Mitchell,
2005). We justify this conclusion noting that any distortion in bilateral asset specific
contributions will impede the trust between the parties involved.

4.2 Scales & Measurements
We employed scales established in the literature. Additionally, modified scales are
employed to accommodate to address the needs of our model. All scales are listed in the
Appendix. The measurement of the supplier and buyer’s asset specificity is adapted from
Katsikeas et al. (2009), Heide and John (1990), Rokkan et al. (2003). The scale for trust is
adapted from Doney and Cannon (1997). The relationship performance construct is modified
from Selnes and Sallis (2003). Control variables include industry, firm age, firm size,
dependence, contact frequencies, and psychic distance between the buyer and seller.
To capture the effect of cross-national variation, we use psychic distance as a subjective
measure of dissimilarity between the international buyer and seller in the context of culture,
language, and legal systems (Johanson and Vahlne 1977; 1990). Psychic distance is a welldeveloped concept in the international business literature. It refers to “the sum of factors
preventing the flow of information from and to the market.” (Johanson and Vahlne 1977) Also,
we contend that using a self-reported measure better fits the assertions of the SET. Social
Exchange Theory suggests that interpretations of the social signals are subjective (Blau 1964).
Using self-reported psychic distance measures appropriately controls the respondent’s subjective
awareness of cross-national differences, better aligning with the SET. Finally, psychic distance
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allows us to capture the overall influences caused by cross-national differences (Katsikeas et al.
2009; Obadia et al. 2015).
Aligning with the interorganizational relationship management literature, we follow the
definition proposed by Doney and Cannon (1997) and argue interorganizational trust as “the
perceived credibility and benevolence of a target of trust” (p.2). In accordance with a review
article on interorganizational trust measures (Seppänen et al. 2007), this is one of the mostly used
definitions in the interorganizational relationship management literature.
To rule out alternative explanations other than reciprocity in trust-building, we capture and
control the effect of the power structure in each interorganizational relationship. Specifically, the
SET suggests that power structure is an alternative motive driving each participant’s
relationship-specific investments (Blau, 1964), and dependence imbalances in each relationship
is a strong proxy for power structure (Emerson 1962). Thus, we control the level of dependencies
to address the effect of our focused reciprocity norm.
To check for common method variance (CMV), we employed the CFA marker approach.
The subjects are questioned about their perceived goal importance in attending trade shows with
items adapted from Godar and O'Connor (2001). CFA marker technique requires a marker
variable that is theoretically unrelated to the focal variables, for which its expected correlation
with the focal variables is zero (Lindell and Whitney 2001). After consulting with two
knowledgeable scholars, we conclude that the proposed CFA marker (the buyers’ goals of
attending the trade show) has no confounding effect on our study.
Overall, all items used were reviewed by two expert academics as well as two experienced
practitioners to check for face validity in this specific research context.
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4.3 Data and Research Subjects
The present study employs SET to analyze a relationship with the unilateral focus on the
buyer’s viewpoint. A unilateral data collection is carried out. There are two reasons for the
research design. First, a unilateral focus allows us to simplify the reciprocity interpretations.
Although an exchange is embedded within the dyad, SET assesses the role of interpretation of
social outcomes (i.e. social reward minus social cost) as a determinant of norm compliance and
perceived relational bond ( Blau, 1964; Granovetter, 1985; Holmes, 1981). For our research,
considering interpretations from both bilateral sides may require massive controls on other
unrelated issues between the dyad, such as misalignments in perceptions caused by information
asymmetry. As a pioneer study investigating sociological meanings underlying asset specificity,
we contend that a unilateral focus on the buyer’s side avoids excessive ambiguity. Therefore, a
unilateral focus on the buyer’s perspective fits our research purpose in addressing the contextual
meaning of asset specificity.
Second, reciprocity in social exchanges is typically based on subjective assessments. Before
reciprocating, a partner must sense, read, and interpret the other side’s actions. The effectiveness
of this process depends on the receiver’s visceral interpretations of such actions (Blau, 1964;
Holmes, 1981). The proposed empirical analysis based on primary data is consistent with the
tenets of SET. Overall, a unilateral focus concurs with the SET in providing a compelling
analysis.
Research Subjects. The data used in this investigation is from a large-scale survey of senior
procurement executives representing international buyers in the global electronics industry. The
sampling scope includes very different companies without particular focus on region or country.
In the electronic OEM–supplier context, buyers have alternative options to partner up with
different sellers (Kang et al. 2009; Jean et al. 2010b). This is important because the SET assumes
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that partners hold the discretion of choosing alternative partnerships (Emerson, 1972, 1976). In
addition, the electronics industry is not immune to high uncertainty and risk. Firms in this
industry must learn to cope with short product life cycles, technological uncertainty, and
difficulties in negotiations for better margins. Business cycles in the electronics industry mature
fast, making it a suitable industry to examine relationship development. As such, the global
electronics industry is an ideal choice for the present investigation.
To access the senior procurement executives of buyer firms in the electronics industry, the
sampling frame comprised of registered buyers in the annual convention of Computex Taipei.
This event is Asia’s largest, and the world’s second-largest, ICT (Information and
Communications Technology) trade show. The event attracts a large cross-section of senior
procurement executives in the industry. It is a meeting place for manufacturers of notebooks,
tablet PCs, motherboards, servers, wafer OEMs, LCD monitors, WLAN (Wireless Local Area
Network, and PND (Portable Navigation Devices). Since 1981, Computex Taipei has come to be
known as an elite gathering of innovators and entrepreneurs who showcase the most advanced
and innovative ICT products. As such, this trade show provides an ideal venue for both a wide
spectrum of subjects and gaining access to electronics industry senior executives.
We randomly selected 1,300 cases among the buyer firms registered in Computex 2014.
Executives at each firm were contacted and asked whether they would be willing to participate in
the survey. After eliminating invalid cases, complete survey data were secured from 202
respondents. The final response rate was 15.5 percent. The countries of origin for the buyers and
sellers are summarized in Table 2. A rich variety of sub-industries are represented: software/IT:
25.25 %; electronics: 30.69 %; chemicals: 1.5 %; telecommunications: 7.9 %; engineering: 8.9
%; and others: 25.76 percent. Respondents are owners (5.9%), top managers including CEOs,
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CFOs, CMOs and the like (17.3%), middle managers (36.6%), purchasing and sales account
managers (20.7%) from global buyer companies. The average tenure (years of service) of
respondents is 7.4 years. Each informant was asked to respond concerning the buying
relationship they considered the most critical to their firm.
------ Insert Table 2 about here -----

4.4 Structural Equation Modelling Analysis
For the analysis, we followed the approach suggested by Hair et al. (2012). These authors
point to the complementary characteristics of covariance-based sequential equation modeling
(CB-SEM) and partial least square sequential equation modeling (PLS-SEM). Following their
suggestion, we first used the CB-SEM technique to conduct a CFA to check the measurement
model validity including all of our used variables measured with reflective scales. Then, PLSSEM is used to test the structural model where we have variables with both formative and
reflective measures. Psychic distance, one of our control variables, is a predefined formative
latent variable. Using PLS-SEM to conduct the structural model analysis allows us to benefit
from PLS’s flexibility in specifying both formative and reflective measures without loss of
information in the data set (Hair et al. 2012). The PLS analysis was conducted using SmartPLS
version 3.1.9 software with the defaulted bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap method and
500 subsample settings. The CFA was conducted using LISREL ver. 8.54.
We assessed the convergent validity of constructs by examining the average variance
extracted (AVE) and the significance of item loadings. The AVE attempts to measure the level of
explained variance that a latent variable component captures from its indicators relative to the
amount due to measurement error. The AVE values should be greater than the 0.50 cut-off level
(Gefen et al. 2011). The construct reliability is examined using the composite reliability (CR)
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developed by Werts et al. (1974). Acceptable values of CR statistic should exceed 0.70 (Fornell
and Larcker 1981). To evaluate the discriminant validity, we compared the square root of AVE
with the correlations among the latent variables (Fornell and Larcker 1981).
To contend with both interaction and inequivalence between buyer and seller’s asset
specificity, we followed the method used by a series of empirical studies from another
established literature stream (He and Wong 2004; Cao et al. 2009; Raisch et al. 2009). Our twoway and three-way interaction terms (i.e. interaction-term between bilateral asset specificity,
interaction-term between bilateral asset specificity × duration, and inequivalences between
bilateral asset specificity × duration) were generated based on the two-stage approach in
SmartPLS with mean-centered interaction terms to avoid multicollinearity. Because our
measures of buyer and seller’s asset specificity are paralleled items, we generated our
inequivalence measures with absolute difference values across pairs of matched items. The
reliability and validity checks empirically support the appropriateness of this approach.
Finally, we conducted a CMV post check with a comprehensive CFA marker technique
presented by Williams et al. (2010). Compared with the partial correlation CFA marker technique
proposed by Lindell and Whitney (2001), the comprehensive CFA marker technique accounts for
the measurement error; therefore it is a superior statistical test for CMV effects in an SEM
setting (Williams et al., 2010).
5. Results
5.1 Measurement Model Results.
The CFA results are reported in Table 3. The CB-SEM technique was employed to conduct
the CFA to ensure robustness of our measurement model. All item loadings reach statistical
significance, indicating convergent validity. The CFA model goodness-of-fit (CFI=0.97.
NNFI=0.95, SRMR=0.058) indicators are satisfactory (Hu and Bentler 1999). Construct
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reliability is supported by composite reliability statistics above 0.7. The AVE statistic is above
0.5, indicating convergent validity (Hair et al., 2009).
The correlation matrix and discriminant validity check are presented in Table 4. All square
roots of the AVEs are greater than the off-diagonal elements in the corresponding rows and
columns, demonstrating discriminant validity (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Overall, these results
show that all statistics in the measurement model reach the requisite threshold suggested in the
literature. We thus confirm the measurement models’ validity using multiple indicators:
reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity.
------ Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here ----5.2 Structural Model and Hypothesis Testing
The PLS structural model checks are summarized in Table 5. He and Wong (2004)
recommend two separate examinations of the interaction-term and absolute difference in two
models to avoid ambiguity in the interpretation of the results. Accordingly, we examined five
PLS structural models by stepwise addition of focal independent variables to ensure robustness
of the results. The Model 1 is the baseline model including only control variables. Because H4 is
the widely accepted hypothesis in literature, we firstly added H4 (trust --> performance) and H1
(goodwill reciprocity --> trust) to Model 2 to incrementally check the validities of the added
hypothesis. The increase in R2 and a minor decrease in SRMR between Model 2 and Model 1
indicates the appropriateness of adding two variables. The significance of coefficients in Model 2
empirically supports H4 and H1. Compared to Model 2, in Model 3 includes Hypothesis 3a
(goodwill reciprocity × duration --> trust). The statistical insignificance of the corresponding
coefficient and increased SRMR denote that Hypothesis 3a is not supported.
Model 4 examines the main effect of violating equivalence reciprocity between asset
specificity on trust. Compared with Model 1, the values of R2 and SRMR are greater in Model 4.
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However, H2 is not supported. In Model 5, we add Hypothesis 3b, which argues that relationship
duration moderates the link between violating equivalence reciprocity and trust. Hypothesis 3b is
confirmed. Model 6 indicates the robustness of results with all variables included. Overall, Three
of five hypotheses are empirically supported (Table 6).
------ Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here ----Figure 2 illustrates the interaction effect within bilateral asset specificity (Model 2)
presented in Table 4. In Figure 2, scenario A in the upper-right side on the dotted line reflects the
practice of equivalence reciprocity (high in both buyer and seller’s asset specificity), where the
corresponding trust value on the vertical axis is the highest. Scenario B over the middle-right
side on the solid line implies the buyer’s indebtedness of reciprocal acts (high in seller’s asset
specificity but low in buyer’s), where the corresponding trust value on the vertical axis is the
second highest. The middle-left side of the dotted line, Scenario C, denotes practices of the
discrete transaction (both low in buyer and seller’s asset specificity), where the corresponding
trust value on the vertical axis is the third highest. The practice of priming trust with favors is
described in scenario D over the bottom-left side on the dotted line (high buyer’s asset specificity
but low in seller’s), where the corresponding trust value on the vertical axis is the lowest.
Figure 3 illustrates how relationship duration serves as a moderator variable. With short
durations (the dotted line with negative slope, given duration equals to mean duration -1×
standard deviation), an increase in inequivalence within bilateral asset specificity would not
significantly decrease trust. In contrast, the solid line with a negative slope denotes long
durations (given duration equals mean duration +1×standard deviation), where an increase in the
magnitude in asset specificity inequivalence significantly diminishes the level of trust.
------ Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here -----
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5.3 Common Method Variance
The results were examined for common method variance (CMV), concluding that the
results are not biased by CMV. First, two of the hypotheses are moderating effects, and the
results indicate statistical significance. According to Siemsen et al. (2010), CMV does not
severely bias if the moderating hypothesis reaches statistical significance. Hence, the statistical
significance of Hypotheses 3b indicates that CMV is not problematic.
Second, in our questionnaire design, we varied the format of measurement items, from a 7point scale (e.g., trust) to open-ended numbers (e.g., duration). The anchor labels of 7-point
scales also vary from construct to construct. These are measurement designs recommended for
avoiding CMV (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Podsakoff et al. 2012).
Finally, we followed the procedures recommended by Williams et al. (2010) and included a
CFA marker in our questionnaire for statistical post check. The results are summarized in Table
7. We first added the marker items into our item pools and conducted an additional CFA analysis.
The results provide reference values for conducting the baseline model parameters. We then
added the marker to conduct the baseline model with the orthogonal approach suggested by
Lindell and Whitney (2001). Next, we allowed the other items to be loaded on the marker with
the equality constraint to build the Method-C model. The insignificant Chi-square difference
between baseline model and Method-C model indicates a lack of congeneric method variance
(Williams et al., 2010). Finally, we let the items used to be freely loaded on the marker to
conduct the Method-U model. The insignificant Chi-square difference between Method-C and
Method-U indicates the results are not biased by non-congeneric method variance (Williams et
al., 2010).
------ Insert Table 7 about here -----
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6. Discussion
Our empirical findings shed light on the two unresolved issues that motivated the present
study. First, the results offer clarifications on the moderating role of relationship duration in
interorganizational trust cultivation. Second, based on the empirical findings, we verify
reciprocity in bilateral asset specificity. A proposed typology is offered to identify four scenarios
in bilateral asset specificity, and we address the buyers’ corresponding level of trust across the
four possible conditions.

6.1 The Contingency Role of Relationship Duration in B2B Trust-Building
We find empirical support for the view that inequivalences within bilateral asset specificity
impair trust over the relationship duration (H3b). Results suggest that violating equivalence
reciprocity becomes more harmful to trust over time. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 5,
relationship duration does not directly influence trust (as a control variable), but significantly
moderates the impact of inequivalent asset specificity on trust (H3b). The findings align with our
contention that relationship duration is the contingency in interorganizational trust-building
rather than an antecedent to measure overall trust-building efforts.
Interestingly, some empirical findings are contrary to expectations. Hypothesis 3a, where
we propose goodwill reciprocity becomes more influential on trust over the duration, is not
supported. Likewise, Hypothesis 2, proposing that violating equivalence reciprocity harms trust
is not supported. However, the findings support another associated proposition that violating
equivalence reciprocity becomes more harmful to trust over relationship duration (Hypothesis
3b).
Plausible explanations for the unsupported hypotheses lie in the different level of strictness
between goodwill and equivalence reciprocity. Goodwill reciprocity has a relatively loose
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requirement that only requires the seller’s asset specificity to reciprocate with the buyer’s.
However, equivalence reciprocity further requires approximately equivalent level of bilateral
asset specificity contributions. Goodwill reciprocity is relatively tolerant of the partner’s
behavior in exchange for the possibility of future pay off. The SET suggests trust cultivation
always requires initiating the process with goodwill so that the other party will reciprocate. This,
in turn, creates another round of reciprocating exchanges (Blau 1964). A purpose for signaling
goodwill is to indebt the other party to reciprocate the favor, but not necessarily immediately or
equivalently (Blau 1964). Goodwill reciprocity permits relatively loose norm-actualization, and
thus it functions universally across all relationships. Our findings suggest that achieving
goodwill reciprocity is a universal norm in trust cultivation that is important, regardless of
relationship maturity.
On the other hand, equivalence reciprocity strictly warrants partners to reciprocate in
relatively equivalent value. This requirement is rigid and stricter. In that, it might take longer for
participants to understand, accept, and internalize as a mutually accepted norm and shared
obligation. This result suggests the idea that young relationships might have completely different
anticipation in bilateral asset specificity compared to mature relationships. Early in the
relationship, there is a ‘honeymoon effect’ which makes the partners less aggressive in their
demands and interprets the relational behavior with a positive forward look (Fichman and
Levinthal 1991). In the more mature relationships, this pattern is replaced by a hangover effect
which more strictly measures the equivalence in relational contributions; such expectations are
formed incrementally through the historical experiences of give-and-take.
Therefore, the differences in the level of strictness between two reciprocity facets might
explain the finding that: (1) the main effect of goodwill reciprocity on trust is significant (H1),
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but the main effect of equivalence reciprocity on trust is not supported after controlling the
duration (H2); (2) influences of equivalence reciprocity on trust are duration-dependent (H3b),
but of goodwill reciprocity are duration-independent (H3a).

6.2 Reciprocity within Bilateral Asset Specificity: A Proposed Typology
The study findings confirm goodwill reciprocity between buyer and seller’s asset specificity
in trust-building (H1). Interorganizational trust cultivation lies in the series of social exchanges
that confirm and update each partner’s goodwill. This research demonstrates that such goodwill
exchange can be achieved within idiosyncratic bilateral asset specificity. A buyer interprets the
goodwill sent from the seller’s asset specificity contingent on the buyer’s incumbent level of
asset specificity.
Based on our findings, we propose a typology of four possible scenarios. This typology is
depicted in Figure 4. In each, we examine, from the buyer’s perspective, how trust develops from
bilateral asset specificity. The four scenarios include: (i) both parties provide contributions with
high asset specificity; (ii) low levels of buyer’s asset specificity, but high levels of seller’s; (iii)
high levels of buyer’s asset specificity, but low levels of seller’s; and (iv) both parties provide
low asset specificity.
------ Insert Figure 4 about here ----The upper-right corner in Figure 4 denotes the case that both goodwill and equivalence
reciprocity is attained, meaning both the buyer and seller have a history of high mutual asset
specificity. In this case, high levels of asset specificity are exchanged with equivalent
contributions. Under these conditions, goodwill reciprocity is achieved through reciprocating
responses, and equivalence reciprocity is satisfied through an approximately equivalent level of
contribution. Attainments in both facets of reciprocity ensure the strongest future predictability in
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the relationship and thus generate the highest level of trust.
In the upper-left corner of Figure 4, the level of buyer’s trust is second highest when
receiving excessive favors in goodwill. In this scenario, the buyer recognizes the seller’s
sacrifice as a goodwill gesture to trigger future reciprocal exchanges. The buyers in this scenario
attain more options to act. That is, the buyer can choose to: (1) selfishly enjoy the partner’s
excessive asset specificity and terminate the relationship by stopping the exchange process; or
(2) to reciprocate with equivalent asset specificity contributions which, in turn, strengthens the
mutual trust in the relationship (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1972, 1976). In other words, the buyer can
potentially take advantage of the seller’s excessive asset specificity. These results indicate that
the perceived goodwill from the seller’s unselfish sacrifice will generate the second highest level
of the buyer’s trust.
The bottom-left corner illustrates a scenario of discrete transactions without significant
social interactions or norms. In this scenario, the buyer’s trust is the third highest. Here, given the
absence of asset specificity from each party, neither participant is handicapped if the relationship
is terminated ( Blau, 1964). The SET refers to this as “economic exchange” as it represents
standardized economic agreements (Blau, 1964). In the case of discrete transactions, buyers are
involved in economic transactions without many exchanges within bilateral asset specificity. The
buyer’s trust toward the seller is based on the contractual obligations and market institutions.
The buyer’s trust is lowest in the ‘favor given in initiating goodwill reciprocity’ scenario,
represented at the bottom-right corner in Figure 4. Buyers in this scenario encounter the potential
risk that the partner might not adhere to norms of goodwill reciprocity. The buyer’s high levels of
asset specificity imply the buyer’s expectation of future payback. If such expectation is not
fulfilled, discord arises (Molm et al., 2007). The lack of reciprocal asset specificity may lead to
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disappointment by the buyer. The buyer’s trust toward the seller declines along with continued
excessive favors.
7. Implications and Directions for Future Research
7.1 Theoretical Contributions
The present investigation contributes to our understanding of interorganizational trust in
four important ways. First, we offer a novel perspective in attempting to resolve mixed findings
regarding the role of relationship duration in interorganizational trust-building. The study
addressed a weakness in existing research – viewing relationship age as a direct measure of
relational bonding and overall efforts on cultivating trust. Building on social exchange theory
(SET), we have been able to demonstrate that interorganizational trust results from the reciprocal
exchanges. The relationship develops as the participants incrementally communicate, internalize,
and mutually accept the meanings and requirements of reciprocity ( Blau, 1964; Cook et al.,
2013; Homans, 1958).
In other words, the results support the view that it is not necessarily how long the
relationship endures that builds trust, but it is how parties interact and communicate with each
other during the relationship. Hence, we confirm that relationship duration does not directly
enhance trust but rather moderates the effect of reciprocating actions on trust. Figure 3 depicts
how relationship duration moderates the connection between asset specificity inequivalence and
trust. We provide an empirically supported explanation for the conflicting findings regarding the
influence of relationship duration. Therefore, the findings clarify the contingency role of
relationship duration with theoretical insights and empirical support.
Second, we address an overlooked approach in interorganizational trust-building -underlying reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity. The present study extends our
understanding of asset specificity by proposing the contextual meanings that are neglected in
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transaction cost analysis. The contingent meanings in bilateral asset specificity represent a
significant departure from how most scholars have been using calculative logic in interpreting
asset specificity. In line with ample critiques of TCA (Granovetter 1985; Chiles and McMackin
1996; Ghoshal and Moran 1996), our findings suggest organizations are not purely economicrational entities in managing interorganizational relationships. We offer rigorous evidence that
the TCA overlooks the social exchange process and interactive nature of interorganizational
trust-building. We specify that organizations are dependent on pre-dispositions and generate
interpretations on asset specificity which are socially embedded in the ongoing exchanges
between dyadic parties. The results yield new nuances of social exchange process within bilateral
asset specificity to extend traditional theoretical concepts. Hence, the findings contribute to
interorganizational trust studies by specifying reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity.
Further, we specify the mutual-contingencies between buyer and seller’s asset specificity on
trust cultivation. Because the TCA deemphasizes the interactive exchanging nature, TCA-based
studies on interorganizational trust portray a simplistic linear connection of one partner’s asset
specificity on trust with the calculative logic (e.g. Doney and Cannon (1997); Katsikeas et al.
(2009)). Studies delineate that, because asset specificity increases the investing party’s switching
cost to be locked-in the relationship, the opponent would reduce concerns for being exploited by
the investing partner’s opportunistic behaviors and thus elevates the opponent’s trust
(Williamson 1994; Geyskens et al. 2006). An underlying assumption in the TCA-based
frameworks is one party’s asset specificity on trust is independent of the other’s existed level of
asset specificity. This assumption does not consider the social contingencies, relationship stages,
and social norms. According to the SET, meanings of relationship-specific inputs are contextualoriented and highly dependent on the history of interaction (Blau 1964; Molm et al. 2007). We
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empirically verify that, in the dynamic social exchange process within bilateral asset specificity,
how buyers read and perceive reciprocity in the seller’s asset specificity would depend on the
buyer’s incumbent level of asset specificity (Figure 4).
Third, this research responds to the call for robust examinations of interorganizational
reciprocity. Scholars have been ardent about the mechanisms and conceptualization of
interorganizational reciprocity (Rokkan et al. 2003; Palmatier et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2016). In
line with studies that suggest multi-faceted reciprocity in interorganizational relationship
management (Hoppner and Griffith 2011; Hoppner et al. 2015; Swärd 2016), the present
investigation further identifies how the dual reciprocity facets (i.e. goodwill and equivalence) are
fulfilled within bilateral asset specificity that, in turn, affect interorganizational trust.
Moreover, the study details how relationship duration varyingly moderates the effects of
dual reciprocity facets on trust. Regarding goodwill reciprocity, our findings suggest that
goodwill is universally essential in cultivating trust across different relationship stages.
Achieving goodwill reciprocity provides momentum in sustaining interorganizational trust in
relationships. On the other hand, equivalence is a stricter facet of reciprocity that requires decent
communication and mutual understandings to be commonly accepted. Our findings suggest that
violating equivalence reciprocity is not universally harmful to trust across all relationship stages.
However, as the relationship matures, the expectation for equivalence is heightened, and each
party becomes less tolerant of inequivalent efforts between the parties (Cook et al., 2013;
Gouldner, 1960). As relationship tenure lengthens, uneven bilateral asset specificity violates the
equivalence reciprocity principle and erodes trust.
Finally, this research also contributes to the SET. In the context of cross-border B2B
relationships, our findings reveal that each party learns and internalizes the norm of reciprocity
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through continuing observations on their international partner’s past actions. . Numerous SET
studies discuss the cross-cultural differences of norms accepted in different societies (Leung and
Morris 2015; Gelfand and Jackson 2016). In a cross-border partnership, common grounds on
appropriate reciprocity may be limited due to cultural differences. However, the present study
suggests mutual requirements on reciprocity can still be established through continuing social
exchanges between international buyers and sellers. Therefore, the findings demonstrate that
reciprocity norm can be established and fulfilled in cross-border partnerships; such norms are
shaped through ongoing bilateral strategic actions such as asset specificity.

7.2 Managerial Implications
The present study offers four implications for managerial practice. First, practitioners would
find the proposed contingency role of duration on interorganizational relationship management to
be of importance. Findings support the view that, in evaluating the robustness of
interorganizational trust, the duration of the relationship is not a solid direct indicator. The
contingent effect of relationship duration on trust is demonstrated. Hence, managers should seek
for more process-based indicators such as mutual asset specificities in a partnership.
Second, managers should also be cognizant that each firm’s expectations in a business
relationship evolve over time. To maintain trust in interorganizational relationships, managers
should accordingly adjust their decisions and activities to align with the dynamic expectations
and changing norms in the relationship. Our findings also imply such collaborative adjustments
with reciprocating attitudes takes time to achieve. Managers should be aware that, because
bilateral consensus on equivalence takes a fair amount of time to achieve, attaining equivalence
reciprocity is a long-term relational asset in international B2B connections. Therefore,
practitioners should regard long-term relationship trust as a unique resource that is valuable, rare,
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costly to imitate, and difficult to be substituted (Barney 1991). The development of such a
competitive advantage lies in mindful management in ongoing social exchanges with senses of
time horizon.
Third, this study specifies the mutual-contingencies between buyer and seller’s asset
specificity in interorganizational trust. We identify the underlying exchange process within
bilateral asset specificity in the interorganizational relationship management. In addition to the
conventional idea of cost-benefit analysis on investment evaluations, practitioners should also be
aware of the reciprocal message being sent when making business decisions in
interorganizational relationship management. Our findings suggest that even asset specificity, a
factor that most scholars and practitioners interpret and evaluate with economic rationality, can
carry substantial social signals in interorganizational relationships. Therefore, managers should
be cognizant of signals sent by one’s partner and should reciprocate accordingly.
Finally, the study implies that strategic decisions should not solely depend on static analysis
but have a long-term and dynamic view. The present value analysis in investment evaluations
might neglect the potential future benefits of long-term business relationship buildings. Benefits
from a relationship should not be limited to present accruals, but be valued for their potential
from the future undertaking. Overall, our research suggests that, in addition to economic
rationale, practitioners should recognize the values of reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity
to bond with key business stakeholders.

7.3 Limitations and Future Research
While the current study provides rich theoretical and practical implications, there are good
grounds for future research. First, due to time and financial constraints, all respondents
completed the questionnaire within a limited time frame. We gathered information on both
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independent and dependent variables from a cross-sectional design. Therefore, mono-respondent
bias is a concern. Future research may benefit from using panel data to clarify the dynamic
aspects and capture possible extensions of the present framework.
Also, as a study with the focus on reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity, this research
follows the SET and focuses on goodwill and equivalence exchanges. Future studies might
consider examining other social meanings within bilateral asset specificity, such as fairness,
justice, and altruism.
Third, to ensure that our findings are generalizable to different cultures, this study
investigated international buyer-seller pairs from a variety of country bases (see Table 2), and
controlled psychic distance in each cross-border partnership pair. Future studies can test our
theorization in different settings to examine the contextual influences. For example, institutional
effects might be another contingent variable to examine if our framework performs differently
across advanced markets, emerging markets, and developing markets.
Fourth, based on multiple meta-analysis studies in interorganizational relationship
management (Geyskens et al. 1999; Palmatier et al. 2006; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 2011;
Leonidou et al. 2014), interorganizational trust is defined as a unidimensional construct.
Accordingly, we used one of the mostly applied definitions from Doney and Cannon (1997) to
align with this research stream. However, we suggest future studies use a multi-faceted definition
of interorganizational trust to thoroughly examine the effects of goodwill and equivalence
reciprocity.
Finally, the proposed conceptualization of reciprocity may also be performed within other
types of bilateral business activities, such as joint marketing campaigns and R&D investments. It
is hoped the present investigation will motivate scholars to pursue such avenues for further
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development of knowledge on interorganizational relationships.
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ESSAY 2: A Conundrum for Importers: To Support or to Against the Exporting
Supplier’s Marketing in the Host Market? A Multi-Dyadic View.
1. Introduction
Since incorporated in 1965, Motokov has been the exclusive importer of the Czech Skoda
automobiles to serve the British market. From 1965 to 1989, Motokov had achieved outstanding
turn over near £60 million per year. Building on their past success, in the 1990s, Motokov
committed more marketing resources in the British market. Motokov’s decision in elevating
marketing efforts significantly promoted Skoda’s brand awareness in U.K. However, Motokov’s
distinguished contributions did not pay off well. The increased brand awareness in the British
market fueled Skoda’ interests of taking over for more profits. In mid 1990s, Skoda decided to
terminate the exclusive distribution contract with Motokov and started their wholly-owned
subsidiary to directly serve the U.K. market. In other words, Motokov’s success of promoting
Skoda in the British market turned out to be threats for Motokov’s own industrial position. Failed
to manage the risk of disintermediation, in 2002, Motokov completely lost its business in U.K.’s
automobile supply chain. In 2006, Motokov could not survive the crisis and was dissolved in
U.K. (Mills and Camek 2004).
The Motokov case exemplifies a conundrum for importers: Should importers contribute
full efforts to enforce and support the supplier’s global marketing in the host market? On the one
hand, suppliers might hold global brand advantages such as acknowledged premium product
qualities, advanced technologies, and established global reputations. In the host market,
importers are motivated to utilize the supplier’s global brand to expand sales, enhance customer
loyalties, and increase price margins. For importers, the contracted supplier’s brand advantage
and global marketing are valuable privileges. Importers can leverage the supplier’s marketing to
better compete with other business rivals in the host market. Therefore, driven by the interests of
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better profits, importers are likely to support and leverage the supplier’s global marketing in the
host market.
On the other hand, faced with the supplier’s advantageous global marketing, importers
might have concerns about the stability of their intermediate role in the global channel. From
importers’ view, the supplier’s marketing in the host market might enhance the host market
buyer’s commitment to the supplier, without likewise increased level of the buyer’s commitment
to the importer themselves. A paradoxical effect of importer’s excellence in supporting the
supplier’s marketing is that it threatens the importer’s own intermediary position. As the
Motokov case describes, the importer’s supports in supplier’s marketing might elevate the
supplier’s brand awareness, market share, and customer loyalties in the host market. These
marketing advancements established by the importer’s support might turn out enabling the
suppliers to cut out the middleman and directly connect with the buyers. The reason is that
disintermediation allows the upstream suppliers to charge higher margins. Hence, in fear of
instabilities of their intermediate roles, importers might choose to adopt non-cooperation strategy
to attenuate or even against the supplier’s global marketing in the host market.
More than one decade after the Motokov’s case, this conundrum for importers is still
relevant to importers’ business. A recent official report on Hong Kong’s importing and exporting
industry suggests: “The business environment for Hong Kong's trading (importing and
exporting) firms is becoming more challenging amid the growing trend toward direct dealing
between customers and manufacturers, known as trade disintermediation (Hong Kong Trade
Development Council, 2017, p. 3). ”
Although the conundrum for importers between to support and to against the supplier’s
marketing is a vital issue in practice, academic discussions remain under-addressed in literature.
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Contemporary studies investigate the exporter-importer relationship from the exporter’s
perspective, with little consideration on the link between importers and host market buyers.
Based on principal-agent theory, extant studies investigate how exporters resolve misaligning
incentives between exporters and importers. For example, studies suggest that exporters could
resolve the issue through formal and customized contracting (Cavusgil et al. 2004; Zhou et al.
2008), incentive designs (Obadia et al. 2015), specified investments to the importer (Katsikeas et
al. 2009), and solid interpersonal and interorganizational connections (Dong et al. 2017).
However, a global vertical-marketing channel is composed of at least three business
parties, including the home market exporter, the intermediary importer, and the host market
industrial buyer (see Figure 5). As exporter’s strategies in managing the exporter-importer
relationship are well understood, relatively scant attention has been devoted to the importer’s
side. Accordingly, this paper aims to investigate on the multi-dyadic relationships from the
importer’s perspective. Therefore, this study intends to answer the following research question:
How do importers deal with the conundrum for importers (to support or to against the supplier’s
marketing in the host market) amid the multi-dyadic business relationships among exporting
suppliers, importers, and host-market buyers?
-------------- Insert Figure 5 Here --------------This paper strives to offer following contributions. First, this paper identifies the
conundrum for importers between two candidate strategies in the host market: non-cooperation
to against supplier’s marketing in the host market; inputting resources to build long-term
oriented relationships with host market buyers.
On the one hand, importers might strategically adopt non-cooperative strategies to
attenuate supplier’s marketing influence on the host market buyers. The purpose is to secure the
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importer’s own intermediate position in the multi-dyadic relationships. Drawing on Dahlquist
and Griffith (2014), we conceptualize the importer’s non-cooperation against supplier’s global
marketing as strategies that attenuate and reduce the supplier’s influences on host market buyers.
On the other hand, when importers’ intermediary position is rather secured, importers
would adjust their customer relationship management strategies to achieve B2B long-term
orientations with the host market buyers. B2B long-term orientation refers to the bilateral
expectation of future interaction that focuses on achieving mutual future goals and is concerned
with both current and future mutual outcomes (Heide and John 1990; Ganesan 1994; Heide and
Wathne 2006). Long-term oriented B2B relationships are evidenced to achieve better strategic
integration (Johnson 1999) and reducing sellers’ future inventory costs and promotion expenses
(Kalwani and Narayandas 1995). Hence, we argue that when importers have strong confidence in
its intermediary role in the present and future, they would actively input resources and efforts to
establish long-term oriented B2B relationships with the host market buyers to achieve best
performances in the long run. Hence, this research illustrates how importers contingently decide
the marketing strategy in the host market to cope with the conundrum for importers.
Second, this research identifies interdependencies among multiple dyadic B2B
relationships (exporter-importer, importer-buyer, and exporter-buyer). To manage the threats of
disintermediation, importers form their relationship management strategies beyond just
evaluating on the single exporter-importer dyadic relationship. Instead, importers hold a more
holistic view and evaluate multiple dyads of exporter-importer, importer-buyer, and exporterbuyer relationships. Drawing on strategic reference point theory (Fiegenbaum et al. 1996;
Shinkle 2012; Hsieh et al. 2015) and relationship marketing theory (Morgan and Hunt 1994;
Garbarino and Johnson 1999), we define the buyer’s relative commitment to the importer than to
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the supplier (abbrev. as the buyer’s relative commitment) as how much the host market buyers
are more committed to the importer than committed to the exporting supplier. We argue that,
with holistic examinations on the multiple dyads, the buyer’s relative commitment indicates the
stability, firmness, and durability of the importer’s intermediary position in the vertical value
chain. As the boundary-spanner bridging between home market and host market, importers are
experienced with both markets and in the advantageous position of forming comprehensive
observation on multiple key B2B dyads to accordingly determine the host market strategies for
their best.
Finally, this paper describes importers’ proactive strategies in elevating their firmness of
industrial positional in the global value chain. As described in Figure 5, importers are frontiers
for delivering first-hand communication, observing host market buyers’ preferences, and offering
instant technical, financial, and logistic support. Rather than passive reactions to the threat of
disintermediation from the supplier’s global marketing, our findings suggest that importers
would build their advantage through ongoing close encounters with host market buyers to
cultivate the buyer’s relative commitment. Our results suggest that, when importers build their
position-shielding advantages that earn the buyer’s relative commitment, importers can
comfortably support and leverage the supplier’s global marketing to create a win-win situation.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next section, the conceptual
framework and research hypotheses are proposed. This is followed by descriptions of the
methodology, measurements, and data analysis of the study. Finally, we conclude the article with
a discussion of the results and its managerial implications.

2. Theoretical Backgrounds and Research Framework
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2.1 Expanding from Dyadic to Multi-Dyadic Relationships: Insights from Supplier-OEM
Relationships
Because prior exporter-importer studies are much based on theories derived from
domestic B2B relationship settings, we briefly review the studies in domestic supplierintermediary relationships. Studies address the importance of dyadic supplier-intermediary
relationship qualities. For example, robust supplier-intermediary relationships enhance bilateral
information sharing and communication (Selnes and Sallis 2003; Hult et al. 2007; Jean et al.
2010a), joint problem-solving (Tuten and Urban 2001; Dong et al. 2017), and better sales and
marketing performances (Kumar et al. 1992; Sa Vinhas and Heide 2014). The critical role of
supplier-intermediary relationship is therefore well-acknowledged. Many studies use the lens of
Principal-Agent Theory to consider the supplier-intermediary relationships (Anderson and Weitz
1989; Bergen et al. 1992; Lassar and Kerr 1996; Obadia and Stöttinger 2015). That is, the
conflicts of interest between suppliers and intermediaries might generate suppliers’ (the
principals) concerns on intermediaries’ (the agents) opportunism. It is imperative for suppliers to
align the downstream intermediary’s incentives with the suppliers through contract designs or
monitoring mechanisms (Obadia et al. 2015).
Although B2B marketing studies have recently moved from dyadic investigations to
multi-dyads in vertical industrial channels (Wathne and Heide 2004; Ross Jr and Robertson
2007; Choi and Wu 2009; Dahlquist and Griffith 2014), the strategies and behaviors adopted by
the intermediaries remain least understood. From suppliers’ standpoint, studies have illustrated
how suppliers manage the relationship with intermediary distributors to best reach their indirect
end customers (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Ross Jr and Robertson 2007; Homburg et al. 2014).
Supply chain management literature also evidences how suppliers can benefit from building
favorable triadic supplier-supplier-buyer business connections (Choi and Wu 2009). From the
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end buyer’ view, substantial works have presented how industrial buyers select their indirect
upstream suppliers and intermediaries to best utilize their benefits (Choi and Hartley 1996;
Wuyts et al. 2004; Hoetker 2005).
However, investigations on the intermediaries’ side are relatively scarce. Given that
intermediaries take the boundary-spanning position in value chain (Piercy 2009; Zhang et al.
2011), the importance of intermediaries in industrial marketing is salient for both (1) delivering
marketing campaigns and communications to the end buyers and (2) observing end customers’
changes in demands and responses to marketing campaigns, passing them back to the supplier. It
is surprising that the role and behaviors of intermediaries are under-discussed in industrial
marketing literature. Therefore, this study aims to offer observations from importers’ side to
investigate intermediary importers’ host market strategies and offer a novel angle in current
literature.
Dahlquist and Griffith (2014) is an exceptional study that investigates the issue from the
intermediaries’ perspective. Dahlquist and Griffith (2014) find that intermediaries might oppose
against supplier’s direct marketing to end buyers. Dahlquist and Griffith (2014) claim that, when
the upstream supplier increases marketing investments to downstream end buyers, the
intermediary firm would sense the threats that the supplier might shift end buyer’s preference to
the supplier’s advantage. Thus, suppliers’ direct marketing investments might lead to
intermediaries’ opposing against suppliers marketing’. As acknowledged in their research
limitations, the conclusion from Dahlquist and Griffith (2014) neglects the intermediarycustomer relationship. Therefore, this paper fulfills this conceptual void in the literature by
showing that, through building connections with the end buyers with value-added services and
asset specificity, intermediaries might acquire buyer’s relative commitment over the suppliers.
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2.2 The Triadic Relationship among Exporters, Importers, and Host Market Buyers
Contracting with importers is a favorable internationalization approach for some
exporting manufacturers since it demands lower cost (Johanson and Vahlne 1977; 1990; Bello
and Lohtia 1995). However, for the exporting suppliers, an issue of partnering with an importer
is that importers might misunderstand, twist, or poorly enforce the supplier’s marketing
campaign in the host market (Cavusgil and Zou 1994; Bello and Gilliland 1997). Prior studies
illustrate that exporters can manage the issue through relational governance (Bello and Gilliland
1997; Leonidou et al. 2014) and formal contract design (Cavusgil et al. 2004; Zhou et al. 2008).
However, as warnings indicated by Liang and Parkhe (1997), importers are the under-explored
party in the international B2B relationship studies. Drivers and consequences of importers’
strategies between enforcing and opposing supplier’s marketing in the host market are little
discussed.
The exporters-importers are like two-sides of coins in the international trade. However,
compared to studies on exporters (Styles et al. 2008; Leonidou et al. 2014; Obadia et al. 2015),
investigations on importers’ strategies are relatively little. Liang and Parkhe (1997) suggested
that the overlooked area of importers’ behaviors might imply an erroneous assumption, which is
that the international trades are always driven and dominated by exporters. Later studies
responding to Liang and Parkhe (1997) have investigated exporter-importer relationships from
the importers’ side, but mostly following the approach of exporter studies that focus on dyadic
relationship qualities between exporters and importers. (Skarmeas et al. 2002; Lee et al. 2004;
Bianchi and Saleh 2010; Leonidou et al. 2011; Saleh et al. 2014a).
During our in-depth interviews, a senior account manager from importing company
shared the insights: “…… (As an importer) It is more than just building relationships with our
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exporting suppliers. Linking with host market buyers also matters a lot. Our host market buyers
are so experienced, brilliant, and professional. If the buyers find our company not offering decent
value-added services, the buyers might directly go to the supplier to remove our role in the value
chain. Hence, assuring values provided and earning commitments from host market customers
are also central tasks for us.” Furthermore, for importers, the threat of disintermediation does not
just come from the supplier side. Over the era of Internet and globalization, host market buyers
can easily access the home market exporter and request for direct business exchanges. Our indepth interviews unveil importers’ concerns on how disintermediation might threat the importers’
industrial position’s stability and firmness. As a boundary-spanner linking between oversea
suppliers and domestic buyers (Piercy 2009; Zhang et al. 2011), importers’ full behaviors and
strategies are much more beyond the exporter-importer dyads. Therefore, to fully understand
how importers resolve the conundrum for importers in the host market, it is essential to account
for the importer-buyer relationship to give the whole picture.
Two reasons account for importers’ multi-dyadic consideration in business relationship
management. First, as the boundary-spanner bridging home market suppliers and host market
buyers (Piercy 2009; Zhang et al. 2011), importers have broad information availabilities for
directly linking to the two stakeholders. We argue that, importers can exploit their bridging role
to draw a holistic view to develop their strategies in multi-dyadic relationships.
Second, for some exporting suppliers, importers are the major frontiers of exporting
channels in the foreign market (Johanson and Vahlne 1977; Bello and Lohtia 1995). Importers
thus also benefit from cross-national market differences between the home country and the host
country. That is, cross-national differences in culture, institutions, economic developments, and
business practices generate barriers for exporting suppliers to accurately interpret information

48

from host markets (Johanson and Vahlne 1977; Laursen et al. 2012). Compared to exporting
suppliers without much experiences in the host market, importers can more precisely read the
host market’s changes in business climate as well as customer preferences to generate more
accurate and responsive strategies. These two reasons enable importers to access comprehensive
and holistic observations on multi-dyads within the vertical industrial channel.
Extended from multi-dyadic business relationship studies in domestic settings (Wathne
and Heide 2004; Ross Jr and Robertson 2007; Choi and Wu 2009; Dahlquist and Griffith 2014),
this study intends to examine the multi-dyadic perspective in cross-national triadic relationships
on the importers’ side. Therefore, this paper proposes a framework from importers’ perspective
to investigate on key determinants of local marketing strategy adoptions (See Figure 6).
------- Insert Figure 6 about here -----Two factors account for the disintermediation threats to contemporary industrial
importers. The first is Information Technology (IT) developments. IT developments have
eliminated the costs of information flows to more directly bridge multiple cross-border business
sectors. For example, IT integration undermine the operating costs of customized online ordering
systems between cross-border buyers and sellers (Jean et al. 2010b; Kim et al. 2013). The IT
advancements, therefore, enhance the level of direct exchanges between foreign suppliers and
domestic customers. The second is the trend of globalization. Globalization has lowered
substantial barriers to direct international trades, such as diminishing costs of cross-national
logistics, integration of world financial systems, and convergence of global consumer
preferences (Cavusgil et al. 2014). For the industrial importers, both IT developments and
globalization have demolished the protection wall of cross-country differences, causing the crisis
of possible international disintermediation. Therefore, due to the recent rapid evolvement of IT
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advancement and globalization, exporting supplier’s marketing on host market buyers generate
forceful disintermediation threats, which constitutes the conundrum for importers between to
support and to against the supplier’s marketing.

2.3 Strategic Reference Point: From Commitment in Dyads to Relative Commitment in MultiDyads
A substantial research stream addresses the importance of commitment in the interorganizational relationship (Dwyer et al. 1987; Anderson and Weitz 1992; Skarmeas et al. 2002;
Palmatier 2008; Zhang et al. 2016). B2B commitment is defined as believes that enduring
relationship with another is so imperative that each party should take certain rules or obligations
at maintaining it (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Ring and Van de Ven 1994). Commitment is evidenced
to be a crucial element of future intentions (Garbarino and Johnson 1999) and a driver of longterm B2B relationship success (Palmatier et al. 2006). Ample evidence has also shown
commitment as a key element in international exporter-importer relationships. (Skarmeas et al.
2002; Bianchi and Saleh 2010; Saleh et al. 2014a).
Strategic reference point theory posits that, organizations can intentionally set up
strategic reference points responding to internal or external pressures to achieve their strategic
goals (Fiegenbaum et al. 1996; Shinkle 2012). Organizational reference point means the targeted
level of performance in specific organizational areas (Ansoff 1979; Fiegenbaum et al. 1996;
Shinkle 2012). Previous studies evidenced that the established strategic reference point
embedded in organizations can originate from threats on the organizations’ survival (Osiyevskyy
and Dewald 2015), and firms might use their major competitors’ performances and strategies as
the key reference point to improve their internal efficiencies (Hsieh et al. 2015).
Accordingly, to evaluate the stability of their industrial position, we argue that importers
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would evaluate and compare the level of commitment among multiple business dyads. Because
the risk of disintermediation is a vital threat for any intermediary company’s survival (Berthon et
al. 2003; Mills and Camek 2004; Walters 2008), we argue the intermediary importers would
regard the supplier-buyer link as the key reference point.
Overall, this paper proposes that, because (1) concerns for disintermediation crisis that
threatens the importer’s survival and (2) full access for thoroughly observations on cross-national
multi-dyads, we believed the reference point theory offers both theoretical foundation and
empirical relevance in understanding managerial insights behind the conundrum for importers.
Drawing from both literatures of relationship marketing (Anderson and Weitz 1992;
Morgan and Hunt 1994; Palmatier 2008; Zhang et al. 2016) and organizational strategic
reference point and aspiration level (Fiegenbaum et al. 1996; Shinkle 2012), we argue that the
buyer’s relative commitment reflects the importer’s confidence in the firmness of their industrial
position. As discussed, we defined the buyer’s relative commitment as how much the host market
buyer is more committed to the importer than to the exporting supplier. As a direct comparison
between the buyer-importer and the buyer-supplier relationships, the buyer’s relative
commitment is the key determinant in deciding importers’ host market strategies to cope with the
conundrum for importers.
2.4 The Conundrum for Importers: to Support or to Against the Exporting Supplier’s
Marketing in the Host Market
The intermediary position enables importers with flexibilities to select host market
strategies. The cross-national structure of exporter-importer relationships increases the exporter’s
difficulties in monitoring importer’s actions and strategies in the host market (Cavusgil et al.
2004; Leonidou et al. 2014). Although formal contracts might list importer’s responsibilities,
incentives, and performance goals, the incompleteness of formal contracts might still leave

51

available rooms or gray areas for importers to design and perform host market strategies on their
own interests (Williamson 1985; Hill 1990; Brown et al. 2000; Lado et al. 2008).
Based on Dahlquist and Griffith (2014), we define non-cooperation as importers’
business approach to reduce the effects of the supplier’s direct marketing investments on host
market customers. Dahlquist and Griffith (2014) find that OEM firms would sense opportunistic
threats of upstream suppliers intentionally shifting end customers’ preferences for the upstream
suppliers’ interests. Likewise, our in-depth interviews with practitioners reveal that, importers
might concern about being exploited or replaced in the global value chain. Hence, noncooperation against exporting suppliers’ marketing is an accessible strategy for importers to
stabilize and secure their intermediate industrial position.
When perceiving the buyer’s relative commitment over the exporting supplier, importers
would not regard disintermediation as a credible threat. Therefore, the buyer’s relative
commitment hinders the chances of non-cooperation against suppliers’ marketing.
Hypothesis 1. The buyer’s relative commitment to the importer than to the supplier
mitigate importers’ non-cooperation against the suppliers’ marketing in host market.
Second, when the buyer’s relative commitment is firm, importers would view exporting
suppliers’ marketing advantages as assets rather than threats in business operations in the host
market. To leverage these assets, importers can invest in developing long-term oriented
relationships with host market buyers. B2B long-term orientation refers perception of mutual
dependence of outcomes that each sector’s contribution is expected to benefit the joint outcomes
in the long run (Ganesan 1994). Such long-term oriented mindset is evidenced to be toward a
specific B2B relationship, not generalized to all business partners (Noordewier et al. 1990).
Indeed, in the buyer-seller setting, research has claimed that long-term oriented B2B relationship
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benefits the supplying firm through reducing transactional cost, inventory cost, and discretionary
expenses in the long run (Kalwani and Narayandas 1995).
Accordingly, for importers, whether or not to build a long-term oriented relationship with
host market buyers depends on importer’s confidence in their intermediary industrial position.
When the threats of disintermediation are salient, there exist high structural uncertainties for the
importers. In this scenario, building long-term oriented relationships with host market buyers is
inaccessible and vulnerable due to severe volatilities and uncertainties (Ganesan 1994; Ryu et al.
2007). On the other hand, when importers are confident and optimistic about their future
business in the marketing channel, importers hold a long-term view in the multi-dyadic
relationship and are more likely to build long-term oriented relationships with host market
buyers. Therefore, the buyer’s relative commitment motivates the importer to invest and build
long-term orientation with host market buyers.
Hypothesis 2. The buyer’s relative commitment to the importer than to the supplier
facilitate importers’ long-term oriented relationships with host market buyers.

2.5 Exporting Supplier’s Marketing Advantages
According to industrial marketing literature (Mudambi et al. 1997; Bendixen et al. 2004;
Aaker 2012), in the multi-dyadic relationships among upstream supplier, intermediary, and
downstream buyers, upstream suppliers can invest in industrial marketing to affect downstream
buyers’ preferences. The first key industrial marketing advantages we identified in the research
context is the exporting suppliers’ brand credibility. Differentiating B2B brand from B2C brands,
Mudambi et al. (1997) identifies company reputation and image as a critical element in B2B
marketing. Specifically, we focus on the credibility of the company brand. Brand credibility
relates to the overall perceived trustworthiness of the brand reputation and image in the received
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brand signal (Erdem et al. 2006). Credibility is evidenced to be a central determinant of
relational commitment (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Fein and Anderson 1997; Sharma and Patterson
1999). Within the B2B multi-dyads, although upstream suppliers in industrial marketing
channels sell their products to intermediary distributors and agents, industrial suppliers can still
earn impactful reputations of their industrial brand credibility to affect indirect buyers’
purchasing decisions (Mudambi et al. 1997; Seyedghorban et al. 2016). For instance, Intel’s chip
ingredient marketing “Intel Inside” in the 1990s effectively signaled the industrial brand
credibility and affected contemporary OEM firms’ procurement decisions (page 31, Aaker 2012).
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3a. The exporting supplier’s brand credibility undermines the buyer’s relative
commitment to the importer than to the supplier.
Another advantage of suppliers’ marketing is direct asset specificity to the host market
buyers. Studies have identified asset specificity as a key determinant in building B2B
commitments, because asset specificity represents credible safeguards of durable relationships
(Williamson 1985; Ganesan 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Jap and Ganesan 2000; Rokkan et al.
2003). For some exporting suppliers, idiosyncratic asset specificity is essential for cross-national
communications and promotions. For example, Cisco not only offers their electronic components
to the intermediary service providers but also sets up direct communication with the oversea
industrial buyers to understand their needs for future product developments (Nidumolu et al.
2009). Cisco thus has invested specified assets in relationships with their indirect customers,
including communication channels, oversea knowledge learning, and customized product
designs. Cisco’s contributions in building online communication channels increase their
customers’ commitment to Cisco themselves due to convenient service accessibility and
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specified knowledge storage in the online system (Afuah 2003). Accordingly, we argue that
exporting suppliers’ asset specificity to the host market buyers facilitates better mutual
communications and exchanges, thus elevating the host market buyer’s commitment to the
supplier.
Hypothesis 3b. The exporting suppliers’ asset specificity to the host market buyer
undermines the buyers’ relative commitment to the importer than to the supplier.

2.6 Importers’ Advantages in Shielding the Intermediate Position
Importers’ advantage in shielding their intermediary position lies in their boundaryspanning role within the business multi-dyads (Joseph et al. 1995; Zhang et al. 2011; Hingley et
al. 2015). Boundary-spanning perspective suggests that, as nodes linking between their upstream
and downstream stakeholders, intermediaries take advantage of the accessible resources from
both sides to develop the position-generated capabilities (Zhang et al. 2011). In our research
context, with widened opportunities to access and communicate with host market industrial
customers, importers are more capable of detecting and satisfying the host market buyer’s needs.
A practical case of leveraging boundary-spanning resources to develop certain
capabilities is Arrow Electronics Incorporated, a Fortune Global 500 company as well as the
largest electronic component distributor in the world. Through Arrow’s worldwide branches
accessing global customers, Arrow’s branded manufacturing suppliers (e.g. Intel) benefit from
Arrow’s services of global marketing, market share expansions, and end customer relationship
building. For Arrow’s customers, Arrow offers industrial design support, delivery, and
component quality evaluation services (Hall and Madigan 2000; 2014). In 2017, Arrow’s
excellent services have won Fortune’s “World’s Most Admired Companies” list for the 17th
consecutive year based on evaluations from industry executives, directors and analysts. (Fortune
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2017).
Due to the relative scarcity of investigations on intermediary-buyer industrial
relationships, we conducted in-depth interviews with practitioners to discuss on importers’
overall competitiveness in value-added services. Our interviews show that, when evaluating on
importers’ competitiveness, the industrial buyers would consider multiple aspects such as the
importer’s reputations, technical supports, and logistic and financial services. Importers’
professional capabilities in these business aspects benefit their industrial customers and thus, in
turn, increase the buyer’s relative commitment.
Hypothesis 4a. Importers’ business competitiveness facilitates the buyer’s relative
commitment to the importer than to the supplier.

In addition to developing boundary-spanning capabilities to increase their
competitiveness, importers can further invest asset specificity to host market buyers to improve
effectiveness and efficiencies of their value-added services. Asset specificity signals the
importers’ high switching cost in the relationship with the host market buyer (Heide and John
1992; Wathne et al. 2001), sending signals of importers’ intentions in agreeing with buyers’
requests. Indeed, in coping with host market buyers’ needs and demands, importers might input
specified investments such as customer-specific knowledge learnings, customized ordering and
operating systems, and specified physical assets such as plants and logistic investments
(Katsikeas et al. 2009). Such idiosyncratic investments are particularly for satisfying and dealing
with specific customers’ needs. Therefore, importers’ asset specificity to host market buyers
would in turn enhance buyers’ commitment to importers.
Hypothesis 4b. Importers’ asset specificity to host market buyers facilitates the buyer’s
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relative commitment to the importer than to the supplier.
3. Methods
3.1 Sampling Frame and Data Collection
We began our research by conducting in-depth interviews with 10 senior managers of
Taiwan import agents. This qualitative and exploratory approach provided valuable input for the
refinement of the questionnaire and the adaptation of key constructs to the context. We also
conducted a pilot study with 12 importers before the survey collection. In the second stage, based
on what we learned in interviews, the pilot study and review of the literature regarding business
to business relationship, we developed the survey instrument using procedures suggested by
Dillman (2011).
In the data collection process, we administered two parts of cross-sectional surveys to
enhance data qualities. Because this study requires responses from upper management as key
respondents, we targeted purchasing managers and sales managers of the importing firms as the
primary informants. For the Part I of the questionnaires, we surveyed the importer’s purchasing
managers to address the relationship between the importer and their major foreign supplier. The
major supplier means the supplier’s products would account for most of importer’s sales
volumes in the host market in the sales year. Then, in Part II, we matched the corresponding the
host market buyer that purchases most of the product/services from the exporting supplier
identified in Part I. We asked the importer’s responsible marketing managers to complete the
questionnaire measuring the importer-buyer relationship. Therefore, for each importer subject,
we collected two parts of paired questionnaires from two key respondents.
We first drew a random sample of 1,814 Taiwanese importers from the official directory
of Importers and Exporters Association of Taiwan which firms located in six metropolitan areas.
The directory provides basic information of companies, including the phone number, e-mail,
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contact address, firm ownership and business type. Before distributing the questionnaires, we
contacted each firm to identify appropriate respondents by phone calls. The respondents needed
to have job title of product, project, or purchasing manager (responsible for contacting upstream
supplier) and key account, sales, or marketing manager (responsible for contacting downstream
customers). As a result, we had a qualified sample of 558 firms accepting to participate in the
survey.
Following the suggestions offered by Dillman (2000b) and Chidlow et al. (2015), we
mailed a packet to qualified respondents which contains: (1) cover letter: explain the purpose of
the study and promise anonymity; (2) questionnaire; (3) return envelope. Respondents were then
contacted again to ascertain their receipt of the questionnaires and were urged to return the
completed questionnaires promptly. After eliminating 13 invalid ones, 164 usable responses
remained for further analysis, resulting in a response rate of 9.04 percent. We checked nonresponse bias by dividing the early respondents of the first quartile and the late respondents of
the last quartile (Dillman 2000a). T-tests were performed on demographic variables such as
employee numbers and relationship age. These descriptive variables show insignificant
differences between the early and late groups in responding to our mail survey.
3.2 Measurement Scales
We used established measurements in previous studies and modified slightly to increase
their applicability in our research context (Table 9. lists all the finalized scales). Table 9 shows the
construct names related measurement items, reliability, convergent validity, and model fitness
statistics (Anderson and Gerbing 1988; Hu and Bentler 1998). All the items are measured with
Lickert seven-point scale (Very strong disagree -3 to very strong agree +3). The scales were
originally developed in English and translated into Chinese to deal with the subject’s language
backgrounds. We used conventional translation and back-translation which were completed
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independently by two English-Chinese bilingual academics (Gelfand et al. 2002). Then, the two
versions of the questionnaire were reviewed by an independent third academic scholar to assure
the Chinese version had achieved idiomatic accuracy. After that, the questionnaire was slightly
refined according to personal interviews with another five marketing and sales managers to make
sure the questionnaire did not have any major concerns with the clarity of instructions. This study
has seven primary constructs: supplier’s brand credibility to the host market buyer, supplier’s asset
specificity to the host market buyer, the importer’s competitiveness to the host market buyer, the
importer’s asset specificity to the host market buyer, buyer’s relative commitment to the importer
over the supplier, importer’s non-cooperation against supplier’s marketing, and importer’s longterm oriented relationship with the host market buyer.
------- Insert Table 9 about here -----The scales for both supplier’s asset specificity to the buyer and importer’s asset specificity
to the buyer are adapted from Anderson and Weitz (1992), Kang et al. (2009), and Subramani and
Venkatraman (2003). On the one hand, our pre-study interviews with practitioners reveal that three
kinds of foreign suppliers’ specified investments were imperative for to accessing local industrial
buyers: investments for product and service promotion, for customized operating or ordering
systems, and for accumulating the specified knowledge in product development. On the other hand,
our interviews also report that customers prefer importer’ investments in physical assets such as
plants and logistics, in customized software, in operating systems, and in knowledge for future
sales program designs. Therefore, the three-item scales of the two asset specificity constructs were
developed with theoretical foundations and adapted base on our interview findings.
We adapted scales used by Erdem et al. (2006) and Worm and Srivastava (2014) to capture
the supplier’s overall brand credibility to the buyer. We followed the definition used by Erdem et
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al. (2006) that brand credibility carries a signal of the believability contained in a brand. Thus, in
our adapted scales, we measure how much the B2B buyers would trust in the brand’s implied skills,
qualities, and how much the supplier would deliver what they promise.
The importers’ competitiveness is composed of multiple aspects including importers’
reputations, technical supports, logistic and financial services. After an extensive search in B2B
literature, we found the criteria of industrial purchasing developed by Hutt and Speh (2007)
adequately fit our research context and best resonate with our practitioners’ feedback insights.
Therefore, our scales for importer’s competitiveness are adapted from Hutt and Speh (2007) and
their follow-up study Zablah et al. (2010).
We used the scales developed by Kim and Frazier (1997) to measure following two B2B
commitment constructs: the buyer’s commitment to the importer and the buyer’s commitment to
the exporting supplier. As mentioned, buyer’s relative commitment is defined as how much the
industrial buyer is more committed to the importer than to the exporting supplier. To capture the
construct, we designed paired items of the two commitment constructs to calculate the difference
scores. Difference score is a decent measurement to address the level of disagreement and
incongruence between two constructs (He and Wong 2004). The rigor of difference score approach
has been evidenced by rich empirical works (Kristof 1996; He and Wong 2004; Andriopoulos and
Lewis 2009; Li and Huang 2012). The satisfactory statistics of factor loadings and reliability
reported in Table 9 also support the appropriateness of our measuring approach.
“Non-cooperation” refers to the intermediary’s behaviour intended to seek ways to mitigate
the supplier’s marketing advantages by offsetting the exporting supplier’s allocation of marketing
investments to the downstream customer (Douthit and Stevens 2014). We made a slight
modification on three items from Douthit and Stevens (2014). Scales for agent’s long-term
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orientation are adapted from Lusch and Brown (1996). Control variables include firm size
(employee number), duration of the relationship, and supplier-agent contract type (exclusive or
non-exclusive).
4. Analyses and Results
We conducted the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and structural equation modeling
(SEM) using software Mplus version 7. The control variables, the importer’s size, relationship
age, and contract type, were included in the CFA and SEM analyses.

4.1 Measurement Model Results
To illustrate, in Table 9 all the t statistics of item loading reach statistical significance at
alpha = 0.01. The Average Variance Extracted (AVE) statistics for each construct are above the
required threshold of 0.5 in the literature (Hair et al. 2009). These are supportive statistics for
convergent validities and satisfactory internal consistency of the hypothesized CFA model. All the
reported construct statistics of Composite Reliability (CR) exceed 0.7, presenting satisfactory
construct reliability from the post check (Hair et al. 2009). The goodness-of-fit statistics are
RMSEA=0.057, CFI=0.934. Based on the combined criteria of RMSEA<0.06 and CFI> 0.90
proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999), the hypothesized CFA model provide acceptable goodnessof-fit.
Table 10 presents the correlation matrix and discriminant validity examination results. We
performed two tests to evaluate discriminant validity. First, Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggested
that discriminant validity can be determined by whether the square root of AVE for each construct
exceeds the correlations between construct pairs. The results in Table 10 demonstrate that the
square root of AVE is greater than pairwise correlation coefficients for each construct. In the
second test, discriminant validity can also be determined by whether the confidence interval of
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correlations between two latent constructs includes 1 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988). Among our pairwise
correlations in CFA, no confidence interval includes 1. These results support discriminant
validities of our measures.
------- Insert Table 10 about here -----Finally, because we require two respondents to report paired questionnaires in data
collection process, such a design of multiple responding sources prevent our results from serious
common method biases (Podsakoff et al. 2012). Indeed, we used Harman’s single factor analysis,
exploratory factor analysis (EFA), and CFA to post-check for common method variance (CMV) in
our sample (Podsakoff and Organ 1986; Chang et al. 2010). The non-rotated single factor explains
only 18% of the variance, and EFA and CFA show no main factor accounting for most correlations
with other factors. Hence, our post-checks show no potential CMV problem in our data sample.
4.2 Structural Model Results
We summarized structural model results in Table 11. The goodness-of-fit statistics
indicate satisfactory results (CFI= 0.921, RMSEA= 0.063) (Gefen et al. 2011). All our
hypothesized links are supported by empirical evidence.
------- Insert Table 11 about here -----In Hypotheses 1 and 2 we address how buyers’ relative commitment determines the
importers’ consequential strategies to cope with supplier’s marketing. The results support
Hypothesis 1 that buyers’ relative commitment decreases the non-cooperation against supplier’s
marketing. Hypothesis 2 testing also confirms that buyers’ relative commitment lead to building
long-term oriented relationships with host market buyers.
In Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we proposed the effects supplier’s brand credibility and direct
asset specificity to the buyer on buyers’ relative commitment. Hypothesis 3a testing indicates that
supplier’s brand credibility undermines buyers’ relative commitment (p=0.084), and the result of
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Hypothesis 3b implies that supplier’s asset specificity directly to the industrial buyer also
undermines buyers’ relative commitment (p=0.006).
Finally, in Hypotheses 4a and 4b, this paper addresses two importers’ shielding
advantages to stabilize the industrial position. The two advantages are importers’
competitiveness and asset specificity to the buyer that benefit buyers’ relative commitment over
the supplier. Our results support Hypothesis 4a that importers’ competitiveness increases the
buyers’ relative commitment (p=0.003), and Hypothesis 4b testing presents importers’ asset
specificity augments the buyers’ relative commitment as well (p=0.091).
5. Discussions and Conclusions
5.1 Theoretical Contributions
This study has following contributions to the literature. First, this study offers insights to
the triadic business relationship among exporters, importers, and host market buyers from the
importer’s side. Responding to the call from Liang and Parkhe (1997) on the need of research on
importers, studies offer ample investigations on exporter-importer relationship management from
the importer’s perspective (Skarmeas et al. 2002; Lee et al. 2004; Dong et al. 2008; Saleh et al.
2014a). However, most empirical studies on exporter-importer relationships solely focus on the
bilateral relationship qualities and governance mechanisms without considering the importerbuyer connection (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Eisenhardt 1989; Bergen et al. 1992; Lusch and
Brown 1996). As suggested by Liang and Parkhe (1997), in addition to the relationship-building
between importers and exporters, scholars should further investigate on importers’ strategy in
linking with other host market stakeholders. Otherwise, the exporter-importer literature would be
lopsided by only addressing on exporters’ view that assumes importers as passive and silent offer
takers (Liang and Parkhe (1997), p.27). Building on the predominant works on relational
elements such as trust and commitment between exporters and importers (Rodríguez and Wilson
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2002; Bianchi and Saleh 2010; Saleh et al. 2014b), this study further describes importers’
strategies in host market to extend the field’s understandings.
Second, this study identifies the interconnectedness among three business dyads
(exporter-importer, importer-buyer, and exporter-buyer) in the cross-national industrial
marketing channel. We identify how characteristics of one business relationship drive the
importer’s corresponding strategies in managing another business relationship. Substantial
studies have described the key relationship factors in establishing solid connection between two
firms (Heide 1994; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Heide and Wathne 2006). In addition to predominant
theories in one-to-one relationship, we employ a holistic view to examine the dynamics among
multiple business dyads. This paper identifies how relationship elements within one B2B pair
(e.g. the exporting supplier’s asset specificity to the host market buyer) affects the relationship
management strategies in another B2B pair (e.g. the importer’s non-cooperation against the
supplier’s marketing) within the vertical marketing channel. The results of this paper suggest
that, although relationship marketing research has extensively examined on the dyadic
framework (Palmatier et al. 2006), relationship factors of a B2B pair cannot fully account for the
firm strategies within the dyad. Therefore, this study proposes a comprehensive framework
beyond the pair horizons.
Finally, numerous conceptual studies have highlighted the crucial role of intermediaries
in marketing channels. Reasons include that intermediaries are the last mile of delivering product
and service values to the end customers (Donnelly 1976; Cosimano 1996) and the frontiers in
gathering knowledge of the market trends and consumers’ preference (Peng and Ilinitch 1998). In
response to the calls of examinations on intermediary’s boundary-spanning function (Joseph et
al. 1995; Zhang et al. 2011; Hingley et al. 2015), this study fills the gap by offering empirical
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investigations from the importer’s standpoint. Our results suggest importers might cultivate
position-generated capabilities in securing their intermediary position. These capabilities
facilitate the buyer’s relative commitment and in turn mitigate the importer’s noncooperation
against exporting supplier’s marketing in the host market. Considering that contemporary
research employs principal-agency theory and view suppliers as dominant principles and
intermediary as inferior agencies (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Eisenhardt 1989; Watson et al.
2015), we believe our findings from the intermediary’s side clarifies the intermediary’ strategy
development and offer a novel angle in literature. Extended from studies on B2B commitments
between dyads (Styles et al. 2008), in considering multi-dyads among suppliers, importers, and
host market buyers, this study proposes the importance of the buyer’s relative commitment to the
importer than to the supplier. Therefore, this study broadens the discussions from contemporary
exporter-importer literature by further considering the importer-buyer link.
5.2 Limitations and Future Studies
First, based on our in-depth interviews with senior practitioners, we have identified two
key dimensions of suppliers’ marketing advantages --- suppliers’ brand credibility and asset
specificity to the buyer --- and two key elements of importers’ advantages in shielding the
intermediate position --- the importers’ business competitiveness and asset specificity to the
buyer. Based on studies on transactional cost economics and relationship marketing, we believed
our findings offer substantial theoretical insights. Future studies might follow this research to
further examine other key elements in multi-dyadic business relationships.
Second, because the current study acts as preliminary research concerning the conundrum
for importers, we selected a cross-sectional measurement to illustrate possible relationships
between constructs. All respondents completed the survey questionnaire within a limited period.
We understand that this type of research is limited in explanations to observed sample trends and
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the findings are restricted to consider time as an intrinsic variable (Lin 1976). Therefore, we
suggest that future research use panel data to further investigate the dynamic trends and capture
possible extensions of the present framework.
Finally, due to time and resource constraints, this research only collects data from
Taiwanese industrial importers regarding their oversea suppliers and domestic buyers. Our
research validities are supported by satisfactory statistics and legit data collection process. Future
studies might apply our framework in other importing contexts to test the generalizability of our
findings.
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Figures
Figure 1. Research Framework of Essay 1
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a: Achieving or violating the reciprocity norm within bilateral asset specificity; Control variables include buyer’s
asset specificity, seller’s asset specificity, dependences, contact frequency, buyer’s firm size, buyer’s firm age, and
psychic distance.

88

Figure 2. Interdependences between Buyer and Seller’s Asset Specificity on Trust (Model 2
in Table 3)
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All stats are standardized.
Scenario A: Buyers perceive equivalence reciprocity, where the buyer’s trust level is highest.
Scenario B: Buyers are indebted by receiving excessive goodwill from the seller, where the
buyer’s trust level is 2nd highest.
Scenario C: Buyers perceive discrete transaction, where the buyer’s trust level is 3rd highest.
Scenario D: Buyers are insecure by giving excessive goodwill without reciprocal feedback,
where the buyers’ trust is the lowest.
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Figure 3. Relationship Duration Moderates the Connections between Violating Equivalence
Reciprocity and Trust (Results of Model 5 in Table 3)
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0 Buyer’s
-0.05 Trust

-1

1

-0.1
-0.15
-0.2
-0.25
-0.3
-0.35

Inequivalence between Buyer and Seller’s Asset Specificity
Duration+1*SD

Duration-1*SD

All stats are standardized. Note: The dotted line denotes that at early relationship stage,
inequivalence within bilateral asset specificity does not significantly influence trust. However, in
relationships with longer durations (the solid line), inequivalence in bilateral asset specificity
violates equivalence reciprocity and significantly undermines trust.
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Figure 4. A Proposed Typology of Reciprocity within Bilateral Asset Specificity (Buyer’s
Perspective)

High

Indebted to Goodwill Reciprocity

Equivalence Reciprocity

Level of Trust: 2nd.

Level of Trust: 1st.

Perceived the seller’s goodwill intentions in

Both goodwill and equivalence reciprocity

invoking reciprocity.

ensure the exchange stability and reliability.

Discrete Transaction

Favor Given in Goodwill Reciprocity

Level of Trust: 3rd.

Level of Trust: 4th.

Discrete exchange without significant social

Faced with the risk that the seller would take

interactions involved or obligated norms.

advantage.

Seller’s Level
of Asset
Specificity

Low

Low

High
Buyer’s Level of Asset Specificity

Descriptions for each quadrant:
Upper-right: Both equivalence and goodwill reciprocity are fulfilled, where the buyer’s trust
level is the highest (1st).
Upper-left: Buyers are indebted by receiving excessive goodwill, where the trust level is 2nd
highest.
Bottom-left: Buyers perceive discrete transaction, where the trust level is 3rd highest.
Bottom-right: Buyers are insecure by giving excessive goodwill without reciprocal feedback,
where the trust level is the lowest.
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Figure 5. Multi-dyadic Structure of Cross-Border Industrial Marketing Channels (Essay 2)

Home
Market

92

Figure 6. Research Framework of Essay 2

Supplier ‘s Brand
Credibility
Exporting
Supplier’s
Marketing
Advantages

H3a-

Importer’s NonCooperation
Against Supplier
‘s Marketing

Supplier ‘s Asset
Specificity to the
Buyer

H1-

H3b-

Importers’
Advantage
in Shielding
Intermediar
y Position

Importer’s
Business
Competitiveness

The Buyer’s
Relative
Commitment a

H4a+

H2+
Importer’s LongTerm Orientation
with the Buyer

H4b+
Importer’s Asset
Specificity to the
Buyer

a: abbreviation of the buyer’s relative commitment to the importer than to the exporting supplier;
Control variables are agent’s firm size (employee numbers), relationship age, cultural distance,
the exclusive/non-exclusive agent contract.
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Tables
Table 1. Conceptualization and Measurements of Reciprocity Elements of Essay 1
Reciprocity

Definition

Measurement

Explanations

Goodwill

Responding with goodwill

Interaction-term between

Seller’s asset specificity inputs

Reciprocity

to reciprocate the

buyer and seller’s asset

reciprocate with the buyer’s

opponent’s favors

specificity

existed asset specificity to signify

Facets

(Gouldner, 1960; Rabin,

goodwill.

1993).
Equivalence

Equivalence in bilateral

Absolute difference

The misalignments between buyer

Reciprocity

contributions devoted or

between buyer and

and seller’s asset specificity

output received (Gouldner,

seller’s asset specificity

signify violations of equivalence.

1960; Hoppner & Griffith,
2011; Sahlins, 1974).
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Table 2. The Country Bases of Sampling Dyads of Essay 1
Regions
Africa

Buyers
2

Sellers
-

China

13

57

Europe

39

19

India

12

1

Indonesia

5

Japan

10

13

Malaysia

1

-

Mongolia

1

-

Mid-East

17

1

North
America
Oceania

21

35

6

-

Philippines

5

1

Singapore

2

3

South
America
South Korea

2

-

4

5

Taiwan

60

66

Thailand

2

1

Asian buyers and sellers are reported at country-level.
All buyer-seller relationship samples are cross-border pairs.
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Table 3 CFA Results and Reliability Tests for Reflective Measures of Essay 1
Items
Buyer’s Asset Specificity 1

Standardized
Loadings
0.832**

Buyer’s Asset Specificity 2

0.919**

Buyer’s Asset Specificity 3

0.882**

Buyer’s Asset Specificity 4

0.791**

Seller’s Asset Specificity 1

0.863**

Seller’s Asset Specificity 2

0.888**

Seller’s Asset Specificity 3

0.868**

Seller’s Asset Specificity 4

0.806**

Trust 1

0.759**

Trust 2

0.736**

Trust 3

0.855**

Trust 4

0.890**

Relationship Performance 1

0.822**

Relationship Performance 2

0.820**

Relationship Performance 3

0.863**

Relationship Performance 4

0.813**

Construct CR

Construct AVE

0.9171

0.7351

0.9169

0.7341

0.8854

0.6602

0.8983

0.6885

** Significant at alpha = .01
CFA model goodness-of-fit statistics: CFI=0.97. NNFI=0.95, SRMR=0.058.
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Table 4 Correlation Matrix and Discriminant Validity of Essay 1.
Constructs

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Buyer’s Asset Specificity

0.857

2. Seller’s Asset Specificity

0.657

0.857

3. Trust

0.331

0.517

0.813

4. Performance

0.495

0.644

0.675

0.830

5. Achieving Goodwill
Reciprocity a

0.095

0.009

0.144

0.052

0.732

6. Violating Equivalence
Reciprocity b

0.005

0.355

0.261

0.230

0.032

0.740

7. Psychic Distance c

0.003

0.168

0.005
0.056
0.061
0.020
0.048
0.209

0.150

0.093

0.044
0.034
0.047
0.108

7

8

9

10

11

-

0.103
0.336 9. Firm Age d
0.086 0.092
0.167 0.024
0.081
0.011 0.113 0.106 10. Firm Size d
0.020 0.048
0.120
0.116
0.159 0.100
0.023 0.138 11. Power d
0.048 0.018
0.087
0.157 0.080
0.118 0.187
0.145 0.143 0.026 0.073
12. Contact Frequency d
0.075 0.014 0.128 0.075
a: Operationalized by interaction-term between buyer and seller’s asset specificity; b: Operationalized by absolute difference

8. Duration d

0.084

0.057

-0.05

0.141

between buyer and seller’s asset specificity; c: Formative construct; d: Constructs measured by single item;
Numbers on the diagonal are the square root of average value extracted (AVE).
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12

-

Table 5. PLS Hypotheses Testing and Model Goodness-of-Fit of Essay 1
Model 1

Model 2

-0.135

-0.122*

-0.030

-0.034

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

-0.122*

-0.122*

-0.122*

-.0.031

-0.020

-0.029

0.156*

0.156*

0.156*

0.031

0.016

0.000

Controlled Effect Estimates
Buyer’s Firm Age ->
Performance
Buyer’s Firm Age -> Trust
Buyer’s Asset Specificity
->Performance
Buyer’s Asset Specificity
-> Trust
Power-> Performance

-0.122*
-0.038
0.156**

0.157*

0.156**

-0.006

0.048

-0.142**

-0.090*

-0.090

-0.090

-0.090

-0.090

Power -> Trust

-0.110

-0.123*

-0.107*

-0.108

-0.089

-0.098

Duration -> Performance

-0.046

-0.009

-0.009

-0.009

-0.009

-0.008

Duration -> Trust

-0.094

-0.075

-0.049

-0.091

-0.088

-0.071

0.086*

0.086*

0.086*

0.124*

0.093

0.089

0.095

0.095

0.095

-0.101

-0.111

-0.106

0.277**

0.277**

0.277**

0.474**

0.479**

0.482**

0.052

0.052

0.052

Contact Frequencies ->
Performance
Contact Frequencies ->
Trust
Psychic Distance>Performance
Psychic Distance->Trust
Seller’s Asset Specificity >Performance
Seller’s Asset Specificity > Trust
Buyer’s Size ->
Performance
Buyer’s Size -> Trust

SRMR

0.087*

0.143**

0.087*

0.121*

0.097*

0.045

0.095

-0.104

-0.119

0.517**

0.277**

0.551**

0.510**

0.046

0.052

-0.015

0.005

-0.027

0.002

0.005

-0.016

0.451**

0.451**

0.451**

0.451**

0.451**

Hypothesized Effect
Estimates
Trust -> Performance (H4)
Achieving Goodwill
Reciprocity a-> Trust (H1)
Achieving Goodwill
Reciprocity a-> Duration > Trust (H3a)
Violating Equivalence
Reciprocity b -> Trust
(H2)
Violating Equivalence
Reciprocity b* Duration ->
Trust (H3b)
PLS Model Goodness-of-Fit
Statistics
Adjusted R2

-0.023

0.147**

0.124*
0.095
-0.096
0.277**
0.528**
0.052

0.124*

0.105*

-0.003
0.001
-0.084

-0.084
-0.076
-0.130**
-0.020**

0.462

0.602

0.602

0.602

0.619

0.619

0.060

0.062

0.064

0.064

0.064

0.065

a: Operationalized by interaction-term between buyer and seller’s asset specificity; b: Operationalized by absolute difference
between buyer and seller’s asset specificity; **: Significant at alpha = .01; *: Significant at alpha = .05.
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Table 6. Summary of Hypotheses Testing of Essay 1
Hypotheses

Contents

Results

Hypothesis 1

Achieving goodwill reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity

Supported

enhances trust.
Hypothesis 2.

Violating equivalence reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity

Not Supported

harms trust.
Hypothesis 3a.

Achieving goodwill reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity

Not Supported

more effectively enhances trust over the relationship duration.
Hypothesis 3b.

Violating equivalence reciprocity within bilateral asset specificity

Supported

more severely harms trust over the relationship duration.
Hypothesis 4.

Trust increases relationship performance.
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Supported

Table 7. CFA Marker: the CMV Check of Essay 1
Model

Chi-Square

df

CFI

CFA

356.39

142

0.96

Baseline

363.97

146

0.96

Method-Constrained

360.21

145

0.96

Method-Unconstrained

351.55

130

0.96

2

Chi-Square Comparison Results

∆χ

∆ df

Chi-Square Critical Value

Baseline vs Method-C

3.76

1

3.841

8.66

15

24.996

Method-C vs Method-U

Note: the insignificance of ∆ χ statistics indicate our results is not biased by congeneric nor non-congeneric
2

method variances.
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Construct

Table 8. Measurement Scales of Essay 1.
Measurement

Buyer’s Firm Age

How long has your firm been in business? ___years

Buyer’s Firm Size

How many full-time employees does your company have?
____employees (employee No.)

Dependence

What percentage of the total purchasing volume in this product
category is accounted for by this supplier (0%.–100%)? ___%.

Relationship

How long have your company been doing business with this

Duration

supplier? _____years

Contact

Please indicate the frequency your firm did business with this

Frequencies

supplier?
(7 points very infrequently… very frequently scale)

Seller’s Asset

(Adapted from Katsikeas et al. (2009), Jan B Heide and John (1990),

Specificity

and Rokkan et al. (2003)).
1.

This supplier has invested a great deal in our business.

2.

This supplier has made extensive internal adjustments in order
to deal effectively with our firm

3.

This supplier has made substantial commitments of time and
money in training their people to deal with our firm.

4.

This supplier has gone out of its way to link us with their
product line or logistic system. (7 points strongly disagree…
strongly agree scale)

Buyer’s Asset

(Adapted from Katsikeas et al. (2009), Jan B Heide and John (1990),

Specificity

and Rokkan et al. (2003)).
1.

We have invested a great deal in this supplier’s business.

2.

We have made extensive internal adjustments in order to deal
effectively with this supplier.

3.

Our firm has made substantial commitments of time and money
in training our people to deal with this supplier.

4.

Our firm has gone out of its way to link this supplier with our
product line or logistic system.
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(7 points strongly disagree… strongly agree scale)
Psychic Distance

(Formative scale adapted from Bello and Briggs (2009); Obadia,
Bello, and Gilliland (2015)) Please evaluate the degree of
dissimilarity in this supplier’s operating country and environment.
1.

Culture (traditions, values, language)

2.

Accepted business practices

3.

Economic environment

4.

Legal system

5.

Communication infrastructure

(7 points very similar… very different scale)
Trust

(Adapted from Doney and Cannon (1997))
1.

This supplier keeps promises it makes to our firm.

2.

We believe the information that this vendor provides us.

3.

When making important decisions, this supplier considers our
welfare as well as its own.

4.

We trust this vendor keeps our best interests in mind.

(7 points strongly disagree… strongly agree scale)
Relationship

(Adapted from Selnes and Sallis (2003))

Performance

1.

Flexibility to handle unforeseen fluctuations in demand has
been improved because of the relationship.

2.

The relationship with this supplier company has resulted in
better product quality.

3.

The relationship has a positive effect on our ability to develop
successful new products.

4.

The relationship helps us to detect changes in end-user needs
and preferences before our competitors do.

(7 points strongly disagree… strongly agree scale)
Relative

(CFA Marker adapted from Godar and O'Connor (2001))

Importance of

Please evaluate the importance of following objectives for your

Goals in Attaining

attendance to this trade show…

Trade Show
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1.

Collect information about new products/developments in the
industry.

2.

Collect information about competitors’ prices, products, and
strategies.

3.

Collect information in general.

(7 points strongly disagree… strongly agree scale)
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Table 9. Scales and Measurement Model Results of Essay 2
Constructs & Item Descriptions

Standardized
loading

Construct: Supplier’s Brand Credibility (AVE= 0.8249, CR= 0.9493).
•

In the eyes of our customer, the supplier’s brand delivers what it promises.

0.798

•

The supplier’s brand has name that our customers trust.

0.980

•

Our customers trust in the skills of the supplier’s brand.

0.955

•

In the eyes of our customer, the supplier’s brand has reputations for high quality.

0.889

Construct: Supplier’s Asset Specificity to the Buyer (AVE= 0.7504, CR= 0.9001).
•

If the supplier terminates the relationship with this end buyer, the supplier would

0.838

lose a lot of investments of promotions it has made in this indirect buyer.
•

If the supplier terminates the relationship with this end buyer, the supplier would

0.910

lose a lot of investments of customized software and operating systems it has
made in this indirect buyer.
•

If the supplier terminates the relationship with this end buyer, the supplier would

0.849

lose a lot of investments of knowledges in developing new products and programs
it has customized for this indirect buyer.

Construct: Importers’ Business Competitiveness (AVE= 0.5707, CR= 0.8673).
Please answer the relative importance of following criteria in the customer’s selection of your
company as the cooperated industrial importer (1-not important…7-very important).
•

The importer’s support services (e.g., pre-sale and post-sale services including

0.812

training, maintenance, call center support).
•

The importer’s functionality (e.g., preciseness, reliability).

0.879

•

The importer’s reputation (e.g., how well known the agent is, how others view it

0.774

in general terms, agent company history).
•

Logistics and distribution offered by the importer (e.g., availability of product,

0.609

ease of ordering, lead time, delivery reliability and convenience, capacity to
handle the order).
•

Price offered by the importer (e.g., quoted price, degree of discount, financial

0.672

support services).

Construct: Importers’ Asset Specificity to the Buyer (AVE= 0.8198, CR= 0.9314).
•

If we terminate the relationship with this customer, we would lose a lot of
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0.869

investments of physical assets we’ve made in this buyer.
•

If we terminate the relationship with this customer, we would lose a lot of

0.851

investments of customized software and operating systems we’ve made in this
buyer.
•

If we terminate the relationship with this customer, we would lose a lot of

0.990

investments of knowledges in developing new programs we’ve customized for
this buyer.

Construct: The Buyer’s Relative Commitment to the Importer than to the Supplier (AVE=
0.5606, CR= 0.7925) a
•

This customer is going to continue business relationship with our firm (or this

0.783

supplier) for many years.
•

This customer devotes more time to us (or this supplier) when we (or this

0.756

supplier) need (s) help.
•

For this customer, we are (or this supplier is) a very important ally of the whole

0.705

distributorship.

Construct: Non-Cooperation Against Supplier ‘s Marketing (AVE= 0.7683, CR= 0.9084).
When considering this Supplier and Industrial Buyer...
•

...our firm seeks ways to reduce the effects of the supplier’s marketing

0.836

investments in the local industrial buyer.
•

...our firm seeks ways to counter the effects of the supplier’s marketing

0.940

investments in the local industrial buyer.
•

...our firm seeks ways to offset the supplier’s influence on the local industrial

0.850

buyer.

Construct: Long-Term Orientation with the Buyer (AVE= 0.7168, CR= 0.8833)
•

We expect the relationship with our major customer to continue a long time.

0.825

•

Renewal of the relationship with our major customer is virtually automatic.

0.801

•

Our relationship with our major customer is enduring.

0.920

a: calculated from different scores of paired items between The Buyer’s Commitment to the
Importer and The Buyer’s Commitment to the Exporting Supplier. AVE: Average Variance
Extracted. CR: Composite Reliability. Goodness-of-fit statistics: RMSEA=0.057, CFI=0.934.
CFA analysis includes control variables.
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Table 10. Correlation Matrix and Discriminant Validity of Essay 2.
Constructs
1
2
3
4
5
1. Supplier’s Brand Credibility
0.908
2. Supplier’s Asset Specificity
0.127
0.866
3. Importers’ Business
0.253
0.094
0.755
Competitiveness
4. Importers’ Asset Specificity
0.065
0.445
0.181
0.905
5. The Buyer’s Relative Commitment -0.018 -0.201 0.246
0.090
0.749
to the Importer than to the Supplier
6. Importer’s Non-Cooperation
-0.003 0.387
0.128
0.261
-0.151
Against Supplier ‘s Marketing
7. Importer’s Long-Term Orientation
0.338
0.043
0.473
0.141
0.194
with the Buyer
Numbers on the diagonal are the square root of average variance extracted (AVE).
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6

7

0.877
0.013

0.847

Table 11. Structural Model Results of Essay 2.
Hypotheses & Controls

Standardized
Estimation
(p-value)

Hypotheses
Hy. 1 The Buyer’s Relative Commitment a-> Importers’ Non-Cooperation
Against Supplier ‘s Marketing (-)
Hy. 2 The Buyer’s Relative Commitment a -> Importers’ Long-term Orientation
to the Buyer (+)
Hy. 3a Importers’ Business Competitiveness -> The Buyer’s Relative
Commitment a (+)
Hy. 3b Importers’ Asset Specificity to the Buyer -> The Buyer’s Relative
Commitment a (+)
Hy. 4a Supplier’s Brand Credibility -> The Buyer’s Relative Commitment a (-)

-0.152 (0.093)*

Hy. 4b Supplier’s Asset Specificity to the Buyer -> The Buyer’s Relative
Commitment a (-)

-0.271 (0.006)**

0.160 (0.070)*
0.276 (0.003)**
0.167 (0.091)*
-0.153 (0.084)*

Controls
Importers’ Size-> The Buyer’s Relative Commitment a

-0.113 (0.257)

Importers’ Size-> Importers’ Non-Cooperation Against Supplier ‘s Marketing

-0.151 (0.113)

Importers’ Size-> Importers’ Long-term Orientation to the Buyer

0.056 (0.349)

Cultural Distance-> The Buyer’s Relative Commitment a

0.009 (0.924)

Cultural Distance-> Importers’ Non-Cooperation Against Supplier ‘s Marketing

-0.193 (0.041)**

Cultural Distance-> Importers’ Long-term Orientation to the Buyer

0.051 (0.388)

The Relationship Age -> The Buyer’s Relative Commitment a

0.117 (0.243)

The Relationship Age -> Importers’ Non-Cooperation Against Supplier ‘s
Marketing
The Relationship Age -> Importers’ Long-term Orientation to the Buyer

0.001 (0.992)

Exclusive/Non-Exclusive Import -> The Buyer’s Relative Commitment a

0.244 (0.261)
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-0.098 (0.458)

Exclusive/Non-Exclusive Import-> Importers’ Non-Cooperation Against Supplier 0.100 (0.636)
‘s Marketing
Exclusive/Non-Exclusive Import -> Importers’ Long-term Orientation to the
-0.098 (0.458)
Buyer
Note: a: abbreviation of the buyer’s relative commitment to the importer than to the exporting
supplier; *: significant at alpha = 0.1. **: significant at alpha = 0.05 (two-tailed). Goodness-offit: CFI= 0.921, RMSEA= 0.063. Control variables are standardized in the SEM model.
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